Chapter 85
An incident of a most striking and unexpected nature now occurred.
Yodo, the Tosa feudatory, addressed to the shogun a memorial exposing the helpless condition of the Bakufu and strongly urging that the administration should be restored to the Emperor in order that the nation might be united to face the dangers of its new career. It is necessary to note here that, although the feudatories have been frequently referred to in these pages as prominent figures in this or that public drama, the feudal chiefs themselves exercised, in Tokugawa days, very little influence on the current of events. A modern historian speaks justly when he says:
"In this respect the descendants of the great Tokugawa statesman found themselves reduced to a position precisely a.n.a.logous to that of the emperor in Kyoto. Sovereign and shogun were alike mere abstractions so far as the practical work of the government was concerned. With the great ma.s.s of the feudal chiefs things fared similarly. These men who, in the days of n.o.bunaga, Hideyos.h.i.+ and Ieyasu, had directed the policies of their fiefs and led their armies in the field, were gradually transformed, during the lone peace of the Tokugawa era, into voluptuous faineants or, at best, thoughtless dilettanti, willing to abandon the direction of their affairs to seneschals and mayors, who, while on the whole their administration was able and loyal, found their account in contriving and perpetuating the effacement of their chiefs. Thus, in effect, the government of the country, taken out of the hands of the shogun and the feudatories, fell into those of their va.s.sals. There were exceptions, of course, but so rare as to be mere accidental... The revolution which involved the fall of the shogunate, and ultimately of feudalism, may be called democratic with regard to the personnel of those who planned and directed it. They were, for the most part, men without either rank or social standing."*
*Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition; article "j.a.pan," by Brinkley.
Keiki himself, although the memorial was directed against him, may fairly be reckoned among these longsighted patriots. The Tosa memorial appealed so forcibly to the convictions he entertained that he at once summoned a council of all feudatories and high officials then in Kyoto; informed them of his resolve to adopt the advice of the memorialist, and, on the following day, handed in his resignation to the Emperor. This memorable event took place on the 14th of October, 1867; and the answer of the Emperor before the a.s.sembly of December 15th marked the end of the shogunate.
THE 122ND SOVEREIGN, THE EMPEROR MUTSUHITO (A.D. 1867-1912)
The throne was occupied at this time by Mutsuhito, who had succeeded on the 13th of February, 1867, at the death of his father, Komei, and who himself died on the 29th day of July 1912. At the time of his accession, the new monarch was in his fifteenth year, having been born on the 3rd of November, 1852.
IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE OF THE RESIGNATION
Undoubtedly Keiki's resignation was presented in all good faith. It deserves to rank among the most memorable incidents of the world's history, for such a sacrifice has seldom been made by any ruler in the interests of his nation. But by the Satsuma and Choshu feudatories, the sincerity of the shogun was not recognized. Through their influence the youthful Emperor was induced to issue an edict calling Keiki a traitor, accusing him of arrogance and disloyalty, declaring that he had not hesitated to violate the commands of the late Emperor, and directing that he should be destroyed. In obedience to this rescript the Tokugawa officials were treated with such harshness that Keiki found it impossible to calm their indignation; it culminated in an abortive attack upon Kyoto. Thereupon, Keiki retired to Yedo, which city he subsequently surrendered unconditionally. But all his former adherents did not show themselves equally placable. An attempt was made to set up a rival candidate for the throne in the person of the Imperial lord-abbot of the Ueno monastery in Yedo; the Aizu clan made a gallant and unsuccessful resistance in the northern provinces, and the shogun's admiral, Yenomoto (afterwards viscount), essayed to establish a republic in Yezo, whither he had retired with the Tokugawa wars.h.i.+ps. But these petty incidents were altogether insignificant compared with the great event of which they were a sequel.
THE MEIJI GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN INTERCOURSE
The year-name was now changed to Meiji (Enlightened Government), from January 1, 1868, a term fully justified by events. One of the earliest acts of the new Government was to invite the foreign representatives to the Imperial city, where the Emperor himself received them in audience, an act of extreme condescension according to j.a.panese canons of etiquette. Thereafter, an Imperial decree announced the sovereign's determination to cement amicable relations with foreign nations, and declared that any j.a.panese subject guilty of violence to a foreigner would be acting in contravention of his sovereign's commands, as well as injuriously to the dignity and good faith of the country in the eyes of the powers with which his Majesty had pledged himself to maintain friends.h.i.+p. So signal was the change that had taken place in the demeanour of the nation's leaders towards foreign intercourse! Only two years earlier, the advent of a squadron of foreign war-vessels at Hyogo had created almost a panic and had caused men to cry out that the precincts of the sacred city of Kyoto were in danger of desecration by barbarian feet. But now the Emperor invited the once hated aliens to his presence, treated them with the utmost courtesy, and publicly greeted them as welcome guests. Such a metamorphosis has greatly perplexed some students of j.a.panese history. Yet the explanation is simple. The Kagos.h.i.+ma and s.h.i.+monoseki expeditions had taught j.a.pan that she was powerless in the face of Western armaments; she had learned that national effacement must be the sequel of seclusion, and, above all, she had come to an understanding that her divided form of government paralyzed her for purposes of resistance to aggression from abroad.
ENGRAVING: STONE AND WOODEN LANTERNS ERECTED IN FRONT OF SHRINES
CHAPTER XLVI
THE MEIJI GOVERNMENT
THE LEADERS OF REFORM
IN describing the events that culminated in the fall of the Tokugawa, frequent references have been made to the feudatories. But it should be clearly understood that the feudal chiefs themselves had very little to do with the consummation of this great change. "The men that conceived and achieved the Revolution of 1867, were chiefly samurai of inferior grade." They numbered fifty-five in all, and of these only thirteen were aristocrats, namely, five feudal barons and eight court n.o.bles. The average age of these fifty-five did not exceed thirty years.
THE EMPEROR'S OATH
The great clans which took part in bringing about this restoration of the administrative power to the Emperor did not altogether trust one another. Hitherto, all political commotions had been planned for the sake of some prominent family or eminent leader, and had resulted merely in altering the personnel of those occupying the seats of power. It was not unnatural that history should have been expected to repeat itself in 1867, especially since the clan mainly responsible, Satsuma, overshadowed all its a.s.sociates with one exception.
Therefore, to many onlookers it seemed that the Tokugawa Government had been overthrown to make room for the all-powerful southern feudatory. In order to provide a safeguard against such a danger, the young Emperor was asked to make oath that a broadly based deliberative a.s.sembly should be convened for the purpose of conducting State affairs in conformity with public opinion. This "coronation oath," as it was subsequently called, came to occupy an important place in political appreciation, and to be interpreted as a promise of a national a.s.sembly. But most a.s.suredly it was not originally intended to carry any such meaning. Its framers never contemplated a parliament in the Occidental sense of the term. Their sole object was to place a barrier in the path of their own selfish ambitions.
ABOLITION
It is more than doubtful whether the abolition of the feudal system found a place in the original plan of the leaders of progress.
Looking back to remote centuries, they may well have imagined that the unification of the empire under one supreme ruler, administering as well as governing, was not incompatible with the existence of the fiefs. But when they examined the problem more closely, they recognized that a universally operative system of laws, a central treasury, and the supreme command of the nation's armaments were essential to the end they had in view, namely, strength derived from unity. Hitherto, each feudatory had a.s.sessed and collected taxes within his fief according to his own free-will, had exercised the right of legislation, and had held the command of all troops within his territories.
The continuance of such conditions would have defeated the purpose of the reformers. This they recognized. But how were these prescriptive privileges to be abolished? An Imperial mandate might indeed have been issued, but even an Imperial mandate without the means of enforcing it would probably have proved futile. In fact, compulsion in any form could not be employed: the only resource was persuasion.
The feudatories of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen were the four most puissant in the empire. They were persuaded to surrender their fiefs to the Throne and to ask for reorganization under a uniform system of law. This example found many imitators. Out of the whole 276 feudatories only seventeen failed to make a similar surrender. It was a wonderful display of patriotic altruism in the case of some, at any rate, of the daimyo. But, at the same time, many undoubtedly obeyed the suggestions of their chief va.s.sals without fully appreciating the cost of obedience. It had long been their habit to abandon the management of their affairs to seneschals (karo), and they followed the custom on this occasion without profound reflection.
With the samurai at large, however, the case was different. For them, the preservation of the fief had always been the prime object of interest and fealty. To uphold it concerned their honour; to preserve it, their means of livelihood. Nothing could have been more remarkable than that these men should have quietly acquiesced in the surrender of legislative and financial autonomy by their chiefs. The most credible explanation is that on this great occasion the samurai obeyed their habitual custom of a.s.sociating some form of self-immolation with every signal deed.
THE NEW ORGANIZATION
The total abolition of feudalism may be said to have now come in sight, but the leading progressists adopted all precautions to consummate their programme without disturbance. They resolved to preserve, at the outset, the semblance of the old system, and to that end the ex-feudatories were nominated to the post of governor in the districts where they had formerly exercised autonomic power. The samurai, however, were left in possession of their incomes and official positions. It was enacted that each governor should receive yearly one-tenth of the revenue of his former fief; that the emoluments of the samurai should be taken in full from the same source, and that the surplus, if any, should go to the Central Government.
The latter was organized with seven departments, namely, Religion, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Army and Navy, Finance, Justice, and Law. This Cabinet was presided over by a premier--necessarily an Imperial prince--and by a vice-premier. Moreover, it was a.s.sisted by a body of eighteen councillors, who comprised the leaders of reform.
Evidently, however, all this was only partial. It is true that the fiefs (hari) had been converted into prefectures (ken), and it is also true that the daimyo had become mere governors. But, on the other hand, the local revenues continued to pa.s.s through the hands of the governors, and in the same hands remained the control of the samurai and the right of appointing and dismissing prefectural officials. A substantial beginning had been made, however, and presently another appeal being addressed to the ex-daimyo, they were induced to pet.i.tion for the surrender of their local autonomy. The same plan was pursued in the case of the samurai. It was essential that these should cease to be hereditary soldiers and officials and should be reabsorbed into the ma.s.s of the people from whom they had sprung originally. Following the course which had proved so successful with the feudatories, a number of samurai were induced to memorialize for permission to lay aside their swords and revert to agriculture. But neither in the case of the feudatories nor in that of the samurai were these self-sacrificing pet.i.tions carried into immediate practice. They merely served as models.
CLAN REPRESENTATION
It may well be supposed that the ambitions of the great clans by which this revolution has been effected proved somewhat difficult to reconcile. The Satsuma feudatory was the first to take umbrage.
He contended that, in selecting the high officials of the new organization, sufficient account had not been taken of the services of his fief. With considerable difficulty he was satisfied by his own appointment to an office second only to that of prime minister.
This incident led, however, to an agreement under which each of the great clans, Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa, should be equally represented in the Government. Thus, the "principle of clan-representation received practical recognition in the organization of the Government. It continued to be recognized for many years, and ultimately became the chief target of attack by party-politicians." It was further arranged, at this time, that each of the above four clans should furnish a contingent of troops to guard the sovereign's person and to form the nucleus of a national army.
ABOLITION OF LOCAL AUTONOMY
It being now considered safe to advance to the next stage of the mediatization of the fiefs, the Emperor issued an edict abolis.h.i.+ng local autonomy; removing the sometime daimyo from their post of prefectural governor; providing that the local revenues should thereafter be sent into the central treasury; declaring the appointment and dismissal of officials to be among the prerogatives of the Imperial Government; directing that the ex-feudatories should continue to receive one-tenth of their former incomes but that they should make Tokyo* their place of permanent residence, and ordaining that the samurai should be left in continued and undisturbed possession of all their hereditary pensions and allowances.
*Yedo was now called Tokyo, or "Eastern Capital;" and Kyoto was named Saikyo, or "Western Capital."
These changes were not so momentous as might be supposed at first sight. It is true that the ex-feudatories were reduced to the position of private gentlemen without even a patent of n.o.bility. But, as a matter of fact, the substance of administrative power had never been possessed by them: it had been left in most cases to their seneschals. Thus, the loss of what they had never fully enjoyed did not greatly distress them. Moreover, they were left in possession of the acc.u.mulated funds of their former fiefs, and, at the same time, an income of one-tenth of their feudal revenues was guaranteed to them--a sum which generally exceeded their former incomes when from the latter had been deducted all charges on account of the maintenance of the fiefs. Therefore, the sacrifice they were required to make was not so bitter after all, but that it was a very substantial sacrifice there can be no question.
THE SAMURAI'S POSITION
The above edict was promulgated on August 29, 1871; that is to say, nearly four years after the fall of the Tokugawa. The samurai, however, remained to be dealt with. Feudalism could not be said to have been abolished so long as the samurai continued to be a cla.s.s apart. These men numbered four hundred thousand and with their families represented a total of about two million souls. They were the empire's soldiers, and in return for devoting their lives to military service they held incomes, some for life, others hereditary, and these emoluments aggregated two millions sterling annually. No reformer, however radical, would have suggested the sudden disestablishment of the samurai system or advocated the wholesale deprivation of incomes won by their forefathers as a reward for loyal service to the State or to the fiefs.
The Government dealt with this problem much as it had done with the problem of the feudatories. In 1873, an Imperial decree announced that the treasury was ready to commute the samurai's incomes on the basis of six-years' purchase in the place of hereditary pensions and four years for life-pensions, half of the money to be paid in cash and the remainder in bonds carrying eight per cent, interest. This measure was in no sense compulsory; the samurai were free to accept or reject it. Not a few chose the former course, but a large majority continued to wear their swords and draw their pensions as of old. The Government, however, felt that there could be no paltering with the situation. Shortly after the issue of the above edict a conscription law was enacted, by which every adult male became liable for military service, whatever his social status. Naturally, this law shocked the samurai. The heavy diminution of their incomes hurt them less, perhaps, than the necessity of laying aside their swords and of giving up their traditional t.i.tle to represent their country in arms.
They had imagined that service in the army and navy would be reserved exclusively for them and their sons, whereas by the conscription law the commonest unit of the people became equally eligible.
ENGRAVING: KIDO KOIN
FRICTION AMONG THE LEADERS OF REFORM
It could not have: been expected that this manner of treating the samurai would obtain universal approval. Already, too, the strain of constructive statesmans.h.i.+p had developed friction among the progressist leaders who had easily marched abreast for destructive purposes. They differed about the subject of a national a.s.sembly, some being inclined to attach more practical importance than others to the Emperor's coronation oath that a broadly based deliberative a.s.sembly should be convened. A small number of zealous reformers wished to regard this as a promise of a national a.s.sembly, but the great majority of the progressist leaders interpreted it merely as a guarantee against the undue preponderance of any one clan. In fact, according to the view of the latter party the broadly based deliberative a.s.sembly was regarded solely as an instrument for eliciting the views of the samurai, and entirely without legislative power. Such an a.s.sembly was actually convened in the early years of the Meiji era, but its second session proved it to be nothing more than a debating club and it was suffered to lapse out of existence.
A more perplexing problem now (1873) presented itself, however. The Korean Court deliberately abandoned the custom followed by it since the time of Hideyos.h.i.+'s invasion--the custom of sending a present-bearing emba.s.sy to felicitate the accession of each shogun.
Moreover, this step was accompanied by an offensive despatch announcing a determination to cease all relations with a renegade from the civilization of the Orient. It may well be imagined how indignantly this att.i.tude of the neighbouring kingdom was resented by j.a.pan. The prominent leaders of national reform at that time were Sanjo and Iwakura, originally Court n.o.bles;* Saigo and Okubo, samurai of Satsuma, and Kido, a samurai of Choshu. In the second rank were several men destined afterwards to attain great celebrity--the late Prince Ito, Marquis Inouye, Count Ok.u.ma, Count Itagaki--often spoken of as the "Rousseau of j.a.pan"--and several others.
*The distinction between Court n.o.bles and territorial n.o.bles had been abolished in 1871.
ENGRAVING: SANJO SANETOMI
The first five, however, were pre-eminent at the moment when Korea sent her offensive message. They were not, however, absolutely united as to policy. Saigo Takamori held some conservative opinions, the chief of which was that he wished to preserve the military cla.s.s in their old position of the empire's only soldiers. He had, therefore, greatly resented the conscription law, and while his discontent was still fresh, the Korean problem presented itself for solution. In Saigo's eyes an oversea war offered the only chance of saving the samurai, since the conscription law had not yet produced any trustworthy soldiers. He therefore voted to draw the sword at once, and in this he obtained the support of several influential men who burned to avenge the nation's disgrace. On the other hand, those in favour of peace insisted that the country must not venture to engage in a foreign war during the era of radical transition.
The discussion was carried to the Emperor's presence; the peace-party prevailed, and Saigo with three other Cabinet ministers resigned. One of the seceders, Eto s.h.i.+mpei, had recourse to arms, but was speedily crushed. Another, Itagaki Taisuke, from that moment stood forth as the champion of representative inst.i.tutions. The third, the most prominent of all, Saigo Takamori, retired to Satsuma and devoted himself to organizing and equipping a strong body of samurai. It is not by any means clear that, in thus acting, Saigo had any revolutionary intention. Posterity agrees in thinking that he sought to exercise control rather than to inspire revolt. He had the support of s.h.i.+mazu Saburo (Hisamitsu), former feudatory of Satsuma, who, although a reformer, resented a wholesale abandonment of j.a.panese customs in favour of foreign. The province of Satsuma thus became a seed-plot of conservative influences, where "Saigo and his constantly augmenting band of samurai found a congenial environment." On the one hand, the Central Government steadily proceeded with the organization of a conscript army, teaching it foreign tactics and equipping it with foreign arms. On the other, the southern clan cherished its band of samurai, arming them with the rifle and drilling them in the manner of Europe, but leaving them always in possession of the samurai's sword.
ENGRAVING: IWAKURA TOMOYOs.h.i.+
THE FORMOSAN EXPEDITION
Before these curious conditions bore any practical fruit, j.a.pan found it necessary to send a military expedition to Formosa. That island was claimed as part of China's domains, but it was not administered by her effectively, and its inhabitants showed great barbarity in their treatment of castaways from the Ryukyu, or Loochoo, Islands.
The Chinese Government's plain function was to punish these acts of cruelty, but as the Peking statesmen showed no disposition to discharge their duty in that respect, j.a.pan took the law into her own hands. A double purpose was thus served. For the expedition to Formosa furnished employment for the Satsuma samurai, and, at the same time, a.s.sured the Ryukyu islanders that j.a.pan was prepared to protect them.