Chapter 84
Public opinion supported the former, and his connexion with the house of Mito seemed to a.s.sure an anti-foreign bias. Chiefly for the latter reason, the Court in Kyoto favoured his nomination.
But Keiki was not really an advocate of national seclusion. Had the succession been given to him then, he would doubtless have adopted a liberal policy. On the other hand, his appointment would have been equivalent to the abdication of Iesada, and in order to avert that catastrophe, the shogun's entourage contrived to obtain the appointment of Ii Kamon no Kami to the post of prime minister in Yedo. This baron was not less capable than courageous. He immediately caused the young daimyo of Kii to be nominated successor to the shogunate, and he signed the Harris treaty. A vehement outcry ensued.
It was claimed that the will of the Imperial Court had been set at nought by signing the treaty without the sovereign's sanction, and that unconditional yielding to foreign demands was intolerable. The Mito baron headed this opposition. But it is observable that even he did not insist upon the maintenance of absolute seclusion. All that he and his followers demanded was that a delay should be imposed in order to obtain time for definite preparation, whereas the premier, Ii, was for the immediate opening of the country.
THE FOURTEENTH SHOGUN, IEMOCHI (1858-1866)
Iesada died in 1858, and the reluctance of the Imperial Court to sanction the succession of Iemochi was evidenced by a long delay in the transmission of the necessary Imperial doc.u.ment. During that interval, the feudatories of Mito and Echizen had a memorable interview with the premier, Ii, whose life seemed at that time to hang by a thread, but who, nevertheless, advanced unflinchingly towards his goal. The three feudatories offered to compromise; in other words, they declared their willingness to subscribe the commercial convention provided that Keiki was appointed shogun; the important fact being thus established that domestic politics had taken precedence of foreign. Ii not only declined this offer, but also did not hesitate to punish the leaders of the opposition by confinement and by temporary exclusion from the Court.
FOREIGN MILITARY SCIENCE
It was during the days of the thirteenth shogun that j.a.pan may be said to have commenced her practical study of foreign military science. Instructors were imported from Holland, and a college was established at Nagasaki. Among its graduates were several historical characters, notably Katsu Rintaro, after-wards Count Katsu, minister of Marine in the Meiji Government. A naval college (Gunkan Kyojujo) also was organized at Tsukiji, in Yedo, while at Akunoura, in Nagasaki, an iron-foundry was erected. There, the first attempt at s.h.i.+pbuilding on foreign lines was made, and there, also, is now situated the premier private dockyard in j.a.pan, namely, that of the Mitsubis.h.i.+ Company. Already, in 1854, the Dutch Government had presented to j.a.pan her first steams.h.i.+p, the Kanko Maru.
FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES AND THE BAKUFU
An indirect consequence of these disputes between the Throne and the Court n.o.bles, on one side, and the Bakufu officials, on the other, was to perplex the foreign representatives who were now residing in Yedo. These representatives learned to believe that the shogun's ministers were determined either to avoid making treaties or to evade them when made. However natural this suspicion may have been, it lacked solid foundation. That is proved by a memorial which the Yedo statesmen addressed to the Throne after the negotiation of the Harris treaty. They made it quite plain that they were acting in perfect good faith, the only doubtful point in the memorial being that, after the organization of a competent army and navy, the problem of peace or war might be decided. "If peaceful relations be maintained by ratifying the treaty," they wrote, "the avaricious aliens will definitely see that there is not much wealth in the country, and thus, abandoning the idea of gain, they will approach us with friendly feelings only and ultimately will pa.s.s under our Emperor's grace. They may then be induced to make grateful offerings to his Majesty, and it will no longer be a question of trade but of tribute." Something of sinister intention seems to present itself between the lines of this doc.u.ment. But we have to remember that it was addressed ultimately to the Kyoto n.o.bles, whose resentment would have been at once excited by the use of friendly or self-effacing language.
There is also on record correspondence that pa.s.sed between the Bakufu premier, Ii, and certain friends of his in the Imperial capital. From these letters it appears that Yedo was advised by the far-seeing section of the Kyoto statesmen to simulate the policy of bringing aliens under j.a.panese influence, and of using for purposes of military and naval development the wealth that would accrue from oversea trade. In a word, the Bakufu had to disguise their policy in terms such as might placate the Kyoto conservatives, and this deception was once carried so far that an envoy sent to Kyoto from Yedo represented the shogun as hostile at heart to foreigners, though tolerating them temporarily as a matter of prudence. It cannot be wondered at that the foreign representatives found much to perplex them in these conditions, or that at the legations in Yedo, as well as among the peoples of Europe and America, an uneasy feeling grew up that j.a.pan waited only for an opportunity to repudiate her treaty engagements.
INTRIGUES IN KYOTO
About this time there began to a.s.semble in the Imperial capital a number of men who, though without social or official status, were at once talented; patriotic, and conservative. At their head stood Umeda Genjiro, who practised as a physician and wrote political brochures under the nom de plume of Umpin. He soon became the centre of a circle of loyalists whose motto was Son-0 Jo-I (Revere the sovereign, expel the barbarians), and a.s.sociated with him were Rai Miki, a son of Rai Sanyo; Yanagawa Seigan; Yos.h.i.+da Shoin; Saigo Kichinosuke--better known as Saigo Takamori, the leader of the Satsuma rebellion of 1877,--Has.h.i.+moto Sanae, and others who have been not unjustly described as the real motive force that brought about the Restoration of 1867.
These men soon came to exercise great influence over the Court n.o.bles--especially Konoe, Takatsukasa, Ichijo, Nijo, and Sanjo--and were consequently able to suggest subjects for the sovereign's rescripts. Thus his Majesty was induced to issue an edict which conveyed a reprimand to the shogun for concluding a treaty without previously referring it to the feudatories, and which suggested that the Mito and Owari feudatories should be released from the sentence of confinement pa.s.sed on them by Ii Kamon no Kami. This edict startled the Bakufu. They at once sent from Yedo envoys to remonstrate with the conservatives, and after a controversy lasting four months, a compromise was effected by which the sovereign postponed any action for the expulsion of foreigners and the shogun declared that his tolerance of international commerce was only temporary. This was regarded as a victory for the shogunate. But the Yedo envoys, during their stay in Kyoto, discovered evidences of a plot to overthrow the Bakufu. Great severity was shown in dealing with this conspiracy. The leaders were beheaded, banished, or ordered to commit suicide; the Mito feudatory being sentenced to perpetual confinement in his fief; the daimyo of Owari, to permanent retirement; and Keiki, former candidate for the succession to the shogunate, being deprived of office and directed to live in seclusion. Many other notable men were subjected to various penalties, and this "Great Judgment of Ansei"--the name of the era--caused a profound sensation throughout the empire. The nation mourned for many sincere patriots who had been sentenced on the flimsiest evidence, and the whole incident tended to accentuate the unpopularity of foreign intercourse.
ENGRAVING: II NAOSUKE
THE SECRET EDICT
The compromise mentioned above as having been effected between Yedo and Kyoto had the effect of stultifying the previously drafted edict which condemned the shogun for concluding a treaty without consulting the feudatories. The edict had not been publicly promulgated, but it had come into the possession of the Mito feudatory, and by his orders had been enclosed in the family tomb, where it was guarded night and day by a strong troop of samurai. The Bakufu insisted that to convey such a doc.u.ment direct from the Throne to a feudatory was a plain trespa.s.s upon the shogun's authority. Mito, however, refused to surrender it. The most uncompromising conservatives of the fief issued a manifesto justifying their refusal, and, as evidence of their sincerity, committed suicide.
a.s.sa.s.sINATION OF II
Nariaki, the Mito baron, now instructed his va.s.sals to surrender the edict. He may have shared the views of his retainers, but he was not prepared to a.s.sert them by taking up arms against his own family. In the face of this instruction the conservative samurai had no choice but to disperse or commit suicide. Some twenty of them, however, made their way to Yedo bent upon killing Ii Kamon no Kami, whom they regarded as the head and front of the evils of the time. The deed was consummated on the morning of the 24th of March, 1860, as Ii was on his way to the shogun's castle. All the a.s.sa.s.sins lost their lives or committed suicide.
ATt.i.tUDE OF THE j.a.pANESE SAMURAI
The slaying of Ii was followed by several similar acts, a few against foreigners and several against j.a.panese leaders of progress. Many evil things have been said of the men by whom these deeds of blood were perpetrated. But we have always to remember, that in their own eyes they obeyed the teachings of hereditary conviction and the dictates of patriotism towards their country as well as loyalty towards their sovereign. It has been abundantly shown in these pages that the original att.i.tude of the j.a.panese towards foreigners was hospitable and liberal. It has also been shown how, in the presence of unwelcome facts, this mood was changed for one of distrust and dislike. Every j.a.panese patriot believed when he refused to admit foreigners to his country in the nineteenth century that he was obeying the injunctions handed down from the lips of his most ill.u.s.trious countrymen, Hideyos.h.i.+, Ieyasu, and Iemitsu--believed, in short, that to re-admit aliens would be to expose the realm to extreme peril and to connive at its loss of independence. He was
THE FIRST FOREIGNERS
It must be conceded, too, that the nineteenth-century foreigner did not present himself to j.a.pan in a very lovable light. His demeanour was marked by all the arrogance habitually shown by the Occidental towards the Oriental, and though the general average of the oversea comers reached a high standard, they approached the solution of all j.a.panese problems with a degree of suspicion which could not fail to be intensely irksome to a proud nation. Even the foreign representatives made it their habit to seek for trickery or abuse in all j.a.panese doings, official or private, and though they doubtless had much warrant for this mood, its display did not tend to conciliate the j.a.panese. Many instances might be cited from the pages of official records and from the columns of local newspapers, but they need not be detailed here.
Moreover, there were difficulties connected with trade. The framers of the treaties had found it necessary to deal with the currency question, and their manner of dealing with it was to stipulate that foreign coins should be exchangeable with j.a.panese, weight for weight. This stipulation did not take into any account the ratio between the precious metals, and as that ratio was fifteen to one in Europe and five to one in j.a.pan, it is obvious that, by the mere process of exchange, a foreign merchant could reap a rich harvest. Of course this was never intended by the framers of the treaty, and when the j.a.panese saw the yellow metal flowing away rapidly from the realm, they adopted the obvious expedient of changing the relative weights of the gold and silver coins.
It may be doubted whether any state would have hesitated to apply that remedy. Yet by the foreigner it was censured as a "gross violation of treaty right" and as "a deliberate attempt on the part of the j.a.panese authorities to raise all the prices of the native produce two hundred per cent, against the foreign purchaser." The British representative, Sir Rutherford Alc.o.c.k, in a despatch written to his Government, at the close of 1859, penned some very caustic comments on the conduct of his countrymen, and did not hesitate to declare that "in estimating the difficulties to be overcome in any attempt to improve the aspect of affairs, if the ill-disguised enmity of the governing cla.s.ses and the indisposition of the Executive Government to give partial effect to the treaties be cla.s.sed among the first and princ.i.p.al of these, the unscrupulous character and dealings of foreigners who frequent the ports for purposes of trade are only second and scarcely inferior in importance, from the sinister character of the influence they exercise."
It is only just, however, to note the other side of the picture, and to observe that the foreign merchant had many causes of legitimate dissatisfaction; that his business was constantly hampered and interrupted by j.a.panese official interference; that the ready recourse which j.a.panese samurai had to deeds of blood against peaceful strangers seemed revoltingly cruel; that he appeared to be surrounded by an atmosphere of perplexity and double dealing, and that the large majority of the Anglo-Saxon tradesmen visiting j.a.pan in the early days of her renewed intercourse had nothing whatever in common with the men described in the above despatch.
KYOTO
In order to follow the sequence of events, it is necessary to revert to Kyoto, which, as the reader will have perceived, was the centre of national politics in this troublous era. An incident apparently of the greatest importance to the Bakufu occurred in 1861. The shogun received the Emperor's sister in marriage. But the auspicious event had to be heavily paid for, since the Bakufu officials were obliged to pledge themselves to expel foreigners within ten years. This inspired new efforts on the part of the conservatives. A number of samurai visited Yokohama, and promised death to any j.a.panese merchant entering into transactions with the aliens. These conservatives further announced the doctrine that the shogun's t.i.tle of sei-i (barbarian-expelling) indicated explicitly that to expel foreigners was his duty, and the shogun's princ.i.p.al officials were so craven that they advised him to apologize for failing to discharge that duty instead of wholly repudiating the extravagant interpretation of the anti-foreign party.
Encouraged by these successes, the extremists in Kyoto induced the sovereign to issue an edict in which, after speaking of the "insufferable and contumelious behaviour of foreigners," of "the loss of prestige and of honour constantly menacing the country," and of the sovereign's "profound solicitude," his Majesty openly cited the shogun's engagement to drive out the aliens within ten years, and explicitly affirmed that the grant of an Imperial princess' hand to the shogun had been intended to secure the unity required for that achievement. Such an edict was in effect an exhortation to every j.a.panese subject to organize an anti-foreign crusade, and it "publicly committed the Bakufu Court to a policy which the latter had neither the power to carry out nor any intention of attempting to carry out."
But at this juncture something like a reaction took place in the Imperial capital. A party of able men, led by Princes Konoe and Iwakura, had the courage to denounce the unwisdom of the extremists, at whose head stood Princes Arisugawa and Sanjo. At that time the most powerful fiefs in j.a.pan were Satsuma and Choshu. Both were hereditarily hostile to the Tokugawa, but were mutually separated by a difference of opinion in the matter of foreign policy, so that when the above two cabals were organized in Kyoto, the Choshu men attached themselves to the extremists, the Satsuma to the moderates. The latter contrived to have an Imperial rescript sent to Yedo by the hands of the Satsuma feudatory, s.h.i.+mazu Hisamitsu. This rescript indicated three courses, one of which the shogun was asked to choose: namely, first, that he himself should proceed to Kyoto for the purpose of there conferring with the princ.i.p.al feudatories as to the best means of tranquillizing the nation; secondly, that the five princ.i.p.al littoral fiefs should be ordered to prepare coast defences, and, thirdly, that Keiki of Mito and the feudatory of Echizen should be appointed to high office in the Bakufu administration.
To obey this rescript was to violate the fundamental law of the Bakufu, namely, that all interference in administrative affairs was forbidden to the Kyoto Court. The only dignified course for the shogun to take was to refuse compliance or to resign, and probably had he done so he would have recovered the power of which he had gradually been deprived by the interference of Kyoto. But his advisers lacked courage to recommend such a course. At their suggestion the shogun signified his willingness to comply with the first and the third of the conditions embodied in the edict. The Satsuma feudatory strongly counselled that the shogun should decline to proceed to Kyoto and should reject all proposals for the expulsion of foreigners, but the Bakufu ignored his advice.
THE NAMAMUGI INCIDENT
At this time there occurred an incident which had the most far-reaching consequences. A party of British subjects, three gentlemen and a lady, met, at Namamugi on the Tokaido, the cortege of the Satsuma feudatory as he was returning from Yedo. Unacquainted with the strict etiquette enforced in j.a.pan in such situations, the foreigners attempted to ride through the procession, the result being that one, Mr. Richardson, was killed, and two of the others were wounded. The upshot of this affair was that the British Government, having demanded the surrender of the samurai implicated in the murder, and having been refused, sent a naval squadron to bombard Kagos.h.i.+ma, the capital of the Satsuma baron. In this engagement, the Satsuma men learned for the first time the utter helplessness of their old weapons and old manner of fighting, and their conversion to progressive ideas was thoroughly effected.
CONTINUED INTRIGUES IN KYOTO
The submissive att.i.tude of the Bakufu towards the Imperial Court encouraged the extremists in Kyoto to prefer fresh demands. Instead of waiting for the shogun to repair to Kyoto, as he had pledged himself to do in compliance with the edict mentioned above, they contrived the issue of another rescript, requiring the Bakufu to proclaim openly the adoption of the alien-expelling policy, and to fix a date for its practical inception. Again the Bakufu yielded.
They did not, indeed, actually take the steps indicated in the rescript, but they promised to consider its contents as soon as the shogun arrived in Kyoto. The extremists, however, could not reconcile themselves to even that delay. In the spring of 1863, they constrained Keiki, who had been appointed guardian to the shogun and who was then in Kyoto, to give an engagement that on the shogun's return to Yedo decisive measures to put an end to foreign intercourse should be begun. This engagement the shogun found awaiting him on his arrival in the Imperial capital, and at the same time messages daily reached him from Yedo, declaring that unless he returned at once to Yedo to settle the Namamugi affair, war with Great Britain would be inevitable. But the conservatives would not allow him to return. They procured the issue of yet another Imperial decree directing that "if the English barbarians wanted a conference, they should repair to Osaka Harbour and receive a point-blank refusal; that the shogun should remain in Kyoto to direct defensive operations, and that he should accompany the Emperor to the shrine of the G.o.d of War where a 'barbarian-quelling sword' would be handed to him." Illness saved the shogun from some of his perplexities and, in his absence, the Yedo statesmen paid the indemnity required by Great Britain for the Namamugi outrage and left her to exact whatever further redress she desired. Accordingly, in July, 1863, a British squadron proceeded to Kagos.h.i.+ma and bombarded it as already described.
THE s.h.i.+MONOSEKI COMPLICATION
If the Satsuma men thus received a conclusive lesson as to the superiority of Western armaments, the Choshu fief was destined to be similarly instructed not long afterwards. It will have been perceived that at this epoch the Imperial Court was very prolific in anti-foreign edicts. One of these actually appointed the 11th of May, 1863, as the date for commencing the barbarian-expelling campaign, and copies of the edict were sent direct to the feudatories without previous reference to the shogun. The Choshu daimyo found the edict so congenial that, without waiting for the appointed day, he opened fire on American, French, and Dutch merchantmen pa.s.sing the Strait of s.h.i.+monoseki, which his batteries commanded. The s.h.i.+ps suffered no injury, but, of course, such an act could not be condoned, and the Bakufu Government being unwilling or unable to give full reparation, the three powers whose vessels had been fired on joined hands with England for the purpose of despatching a squadron to destroy the Choshu forts, which result was attained with the greatest ease. This "s.h.i.+monoseki Expedition," as it was called, enormously strengthened the conviction which the bombardment of Kagos.h.i.+ma had established.
The nation thoroughly appreciated its own belligerent incapacity when foreign powers entered the lists, and patriotic men began to say unhesitatingly that their country was fatally weakened by the dual system of government.
CHANGE OF OPINION IN KYOTO
The sway exercised by the extremists in Kyoto now received a check owing to their excessive zeal. They procured the drafting of an Imperial edict which declared the Emperor's resolve to drive out the foreigners, and announced a visit by his Majesty to the great shrines to pray for success. This edict never received the Imperial seal. The extremists appear to have overrated their influence at Court. They counted erroneously on his Majesty's post facto compliance, and they thus created an opportunity of which the moderates took immediate advantage. At the instance of the latter and in consideration of the fict.i.tious edict, Mori Motonori of Choshu, leader of the extremists, was ordered to leave the capital with all the n.o.bles who shared his opinions. Doubtless the bombardment of Kagos.h.i.+ma contributed not a little to this measure, but the ostensible cause was the irregularity of the edict. There was no open disavowal of conservatism, but, on the other hand, there was no attempt to enforce it. The situation for the extremists was further impaired by an appeal to force on the part of the Choshu samurai. They essayed to enter Kyoto under arms, for the ostensible purpose of presenting a pet.i.tion to the Throne but really to make away with the moderate leaders. This political coup failed signally, and from that time the ardent advocates of the anti-foreign policy began to be regarded as rebels. Just at this time the s.h.i.+monoseki expedition gave an object lesson to the nation, and helped to deprive the barbarian-expelling agitation of any semblance of Imperial sanction.
CHOSHU AND THE BAKUFU
When the Choshu feudatory attempted to close the s.h.i.+monoseki Strait by means of cannon, the Bakufu sent a commissioner to remonstrate.
But the Choshu samurai insisted that they had merely obeyed the sovereign's order, and the better to demonstrate their resolution, they put the commissioner to death. Thus directly challenged, the Bakufu mustered a powerful force and launched it against Choshu. But by this time the two great southern clans, having learned the madness of appealing to force for the purpose of keeping the country closed, had agreed to work together in the interests of the State. Thus, when the Bakufu army, comprising contingents from thirty-six feudatories, reached Choshu, the latter appealed to the clemency of the invading generals, among whom the Satsuma baron was the most powerful, and the appeal resulted in the withdrawal of the punitory expedition without the imposition of any conditions. The Bakufu were naturally much incensed. Another formidable force was organized to attack Choshu, but it halted at Osaka and sent envoys to announce the punishment of the rebellious fief, to which announcements the fief paid not the least attention.
THE HYOGO DEMONSTRATION
While things were at this stage, Sir Harry Parkes, representative of Great Britain, arrived upon the scene in the Far East. A man of remarkably luminous judgment and military methods, this distinguished diplomatist appreciated almost immediately that the ratification of the treaties by the sovereign was essential to their validity, and that by investing the ratification with all possible formality, the Emperor's recovery of administrative power might be accelerated. He therefore conceived the idea of repairing to Hyogo with a powerful naval squadron for the purpose of seeking, first, the ratification of the treaty; secondly, the reduction of the import tariff from an average of fifteen per cent, ad valorem (at which figure it had been fixed by the original treaty) to five per cent., and, thirdly, the opening of the ports of Hyogo and Osaka at once, instead of nearly two years hence, as previously agreed.
Among the penalties imposed upon Choshu by the four powers which combined to destroy the forts at s.h.i.+monoseki was a fine of three million dollars, and the Bakufu, being unable to collect this money from Choshu, had taken upon themselves the duty of paying it and had already paid one million. Sir Harry Parkes's plan was to remit the remaining two millions in consideration of the Government endorsing the three demands formulated above. It need hardly be said that the appearance of a powerful squadron of foreign wars.h.i.+ps at the very portals of the Imperial palace threw the nation into a ferment. The eight vessels cast anchor off Hyogo in November, 1866, and it seemed to the nation that the problem of foreign intercourse had been revived in an aggravated form.
Once again the anti-foreign agitators recovered their influence, and inveighed against the Bakufu's incompetence to avert such trespa.s.ses even from the sacred city. Under the pressure brought to bear by these conservatives, the Emperor dismissed from office or otherwise punished the ministers appointed by the shogun to negotiate with the foreign representatives, and in the face of this humiliating disavowal of Bakufu authority, the shogun had no alternative except to resign. He did so. But the Imperial Court hesitated to accept the responsibilities that would have resulted from sanctioning his resignation. The Bakufu were informed that the Emperor sanctioned the treaties and that the shogun was authorized to deal with them, but that steps must be taken to revise them in consultation with the feudatories, and that Hyogo and Osaka must not be opened, though the proposed change of tariff-rate would be permitted. Nothing definite was said about remitting the two million dollars remaining from the Choshu fine, and Sir Harry Parkes was able to say triumphantly that he had obtained two out of three concessions demanded by him without having given any quid pro whatever.
THE LAST OF THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNS
The measures against Choshu were now recommenced, but with complete unsuccess, and thus a final blow was given to the prestige of the Yedo Government. It was at this time (1866) that the fourteenth shogun, Iemochi, pa.s.sed away and was succeeded by Yos.h.i.+n.o.bu, better known, as Keiki. Whatever the political views of this n.o.bleman may have been when he was put forward by the conservatives, in 1857, as a candidate for succession to the shogunate, he no sooner attained that dignity, in 1866, than he became an ardent advocate of progress.
French experts were engaged to remodel the army, and English officers to organize the navy; the shogun's brother was sent to the Paris Exposition, and Occidental fas.h.i.+ons were introduced at the ceremonies of the Bakufu Court.
SATSUMA AND CHOSHU
When Keiki a.s.sumed office he had to deal speedily with two problems; that is to say, the complication with Choshu, and the opening of Hyogo. The Emperor's reluctant consent to the latter was obtained for the beginning of 1868, and an edict was also issued for the punishment of Choshu. The result was two-fold: fresh life was imparted to the anti-foreign agitation, and the Satsuma and Choshu feudatories were induced to join hands against the Tokugawa. Alike in Satsuma and in Choshu, there were a number of clever men who had long laboured to combine the forces of the two fiefs in order to unite the whole empire under the sway of the Kyoto Court. Saigo and Okubo on the Satsuma side, Kido and Sanjo on the Choshu became leading figures on the stage of their country's new career. Through their influence, aided by that of Ito, afterwards prince, and Inouye, afterwards marquis, the two great clans were brought into alliance, and when, in 1867, the shogun, Keiki, sought and obtained Imperial sanction for the punishment of Choshu, Satsuma agreed to enter the lists on the latter's side.
TOSA MEMORIAL