Chapter 62
This episode was, of course, not conclusive. It merely showed that so long as Nagamasa and Yos.h.i.+kage worked in combination, n.o.bunaga's position in Kyoto and his communications with his base in Mino must remain insecure. He himself would have directed his forces at once against Nagamasa, but Hideyos.h.i.+ contended that the wiser plan would be to endeavour to win over some of the minor barons whose strongholds lay on the confines of Omi and Mino. This was gradually accomplished, and after an unsuccessful attempt upon the part of Sasaki Shotei of Omi to capture a castle (Choko-ji) which was under the command of n.o.bunaga's chief general, Katsuiye, the Owari forces were put in motion against Nagamasa's princ.i.p.al strongholds, Otani and Yoko-yama. The former was attacked first, n.o.bunaga being a.s.sisted by a contingent of five thousand men under the command of Ieyasu.
Three days of repeated a.s.saults failed to reduce the castle, and during that interval Nagamasa and Yos.h.i.+kage were able to enter the field at the head of a force which greatly outnumbered the Owari army.
In midsummer, 1570, there was fought, on the banks of the Ane-gawa, one of the great battles of j.a.panese history. It resulted in the complete discomfiture of the Echizen chieftains. The records say that three thousand of their followers were killed and that among them were ten general officers. The castle of Otani, however, remained in Nagamasa's hands. n.o.bunaga now retired to his headquarters in Gifu to rest his forces.
But he was quickly summoned again to the field by a revolt on the part of the Buddhist priests in the province of Settsu, under the banner of Miyos.h.i.+ Yos.h.i.+tsugu and Saito Tatsuoki. n.o.bunaga's attempt to quell this insurrection was unsuccessful, and immediately Nagamasa and Yos.h.i.+kage seized the occasion to march upon Kyoto. The priests of Hiei-zan received them with open arms, and they occupied on the monastery's commanding site, a position well-nigh impregnable, from which they constantly menaced the capital. It was now the commencement of winter. For the invading troops to hold their own upon Hiei-zan throughout the winter would have been even more difficult than for n.o.bunaga's army to cut off their avenues of retreat and supply.
In these circ.u.mstances peace presented itself to both sides as the most feasible plan, and the forces of Nagamasa and Yos.h.i.+kage were allowed to march away unmolested to Omi and Echizen, respectively.
This result was intensely mortifying to Hideyos.h.i.+, who had devoted his whole energies to the destruction of these dangerous enemies. But the final issue was only postponed. By contrivances, which need not be related in detail, Nagamasa was again induced to take the field, and, in 1573, the Owari forces found themselves once more confronted by the allied armies of Echizen and Omi. By clever strategy the Echizen baron was induced to take the fatal step of separating himself from his Omi colleague, and at Tone-yama he sustained a crus.h.i.+ng defeat, leaving two thousand of his men and twenty-three of his captains dead upon the field. He himself fled and for a time remained concealed, but ultimately, being closely menaced with capture, he committed suicide. Meanwhile, Nagamasa had withdrawn to his stronghold of Otani, where he was besieged by n.o.bunaga. The castle ultimately fell, Nagamasa and his son dying by their own hands.
This year witnessed also the death of Takeda s.h.i.+ngen, and thus n.o.bunaga not only established his sway over the whole of the provinces of Omi and Echizen but also was relieved from the constant menace of a formidable attack by a captain to whom public opinion justly attributed the leading place among j.a.panese strategists. The whole of Nagamasa's estates, yielding an annual return of 180,000 koku, was given to Hideyos.h.i.+, and he was ordered to a.s.sume the command of Otani Castle, whence, however, he moved shortly afterwards to Nagahama.
HIEI-ZAN
It was now possible for n.o.bunaga to devote his entire attention to the soldier-priests who had allied themselves with his enemies. It has been shown that the monastery of Hiei-zan had afforded shelter and sustenance to the forces of Echizen and Omi during the winter of 1570-1571, and it has been shown also that n.o.bunaga, underrating the strength of the priests in the province of Settsu, sustained defeat at their hands. He now (1574) sent an army to hold the soldier-monks of Settsu in check while he himself dealt with Hiei-zan. This great monastery, as already shown, was erected in the ninth century in obedience to the Buddhist superst.i.tion that the northeastern quarter of the heavens is the "Demon's Gate," and that a temple must be erected there to afford security against evil influences. The temple on Hiei-zan had received the munificent patronage of monarch after monarch, and had grown to be a huge monastery, containing some three thousand priests. This miniature city completely commanded Kyoto, and was guarded in front by a great lake. But, above all, it was sanctified by the superst.i.tion of the people, and when n.o.bunaga invested it, he found the greatest reluctance on the part of his generals to proceed to extremities. Nevertheless, he overcame these scruples, and drawing a cordon of troops round the great monastery, he applied the torch to the buildings, burnt to death nearly all its inmates, including women, confiscated its estates, and built, for purposes of future prevention, a castle at Sakamoto, which was placed under the command of Akechi Mitsuhide. When, in after years, this same Mitsuhide treacherously compa.s.sed n.o.bunaga's death, men said that the opening of the Demon's Gate had entailed its due penalty.
OTHER PRIESTLY DISTURBANCES
It was not in Settsu and at Hiei-zan only that the Buddhist soldiers turned their weapons against n.o.bunaga. The Asai sept received a.s.sistance from no less than ten temples in Omi; the Asakura family had the ranks of its soldiers recruited from monasteries in Echizen and Kaga; the Saito clan received aid from the bonzes in Izumi and Iga, and the priests of the great temple Hongwan-ji in Osaka were in friendly communication with the Mori sept in the west, with the Takeda in Kai, and with the Hojo in Sagami. In fact, the difficulties encountered by n.o.bunaga in his attempts to bring the whole empire under the affective sway of the Throne were incalculably accentuated by the hostility of the great s.h.i.+n sect of Buddhism. He dealt effectually with all except the monastery at Is.h.i.+-yama in Osaka. The immense natural strength of the position and the strategical ability of its lord-abbot, Kosa, enabled it to defy all the a.s.saults of the Owari chief, and it was not until 1588--six years after n.o.bunaga's death--that, through the intervention of the Emperor, peace was finally restored. After eleven years of almost incessant struggle, his Majesty's envoy, Konoe Sakihisa, succeeded in inducing the Ikko priests to lay down their arms. It will be presently seen that the inveterate hostility shown by the Buddhists to n.o.bunaga was largely responsible for his favourable att.i.tude towards Christianity.
THE CASTLE OF AZUCHI
The lightness and flimsiness of construction in j.a.panese houses has been noted already several times. Even though there was continual warfare in the provinces of family against family, the character of the fighting and of the weapons used was such that there was little need for the building of elaborate defenses, and there was practically nothing worthy the name of a castle. Watch-towers had been built and roofs and walls were sometimes protected by putting nails in the building points outward,--a sort of chevaux de frise.
But a system of outlying defenses, ditch, earthen wall and wooden palisade, was all that was used so long as fighting was either hand-to-hand or with missiles no more penetrating than arrows. But when fire-arms were introduced in 1542, ma.s.sively constructed castles began to be built. These were in general patterned after Western models, but with many minor modifications.
The first of these fortresses was built at Azuchi, in Omi, under the auspices of Oda n.o.bunaga. Commenced in 1576, the work was completed in 1579. In the centre of the castle rose a tower ninety feet high, standing on a ma.s.sive stone bas.e.m.e.nt seventy-two feet in height, the whole forming a structure absolutely without precedent in j.a.pan. The tower was of wood, and had, therefore, no capacity for resisting cannon. But, as a matter of fact, artillery can scarcely be said to have been used in j.a.pan until modern days. n.o.bunaga's castle is stated by some historians to have been partially attributable to Christianity, but this theory seems to rest solely upon the fact that the central tower was known as Tenshu-kaku, or the "tower of the lord of Heaven." There were more numerous indications that the spirit of Buddhism influenced the architect, for in one of the highest storeys of the tower, the four "guardian kings" were placed, and in the lower chamber stood an effigy of Tamon (Ananda). The cost of constructing this colossal edifice was very heavy, and funds had to be collected from the whole of the eleven provinces then under n.o.bunaga's sway.
n.o.bUNAGA AND IEYASU
It has already been noted that Ieyasu was n.o.bunaga's sole ally in the east of j.a.pan at the time of the fall of the Imagawa clan. It has also been noted that Ujizane, the son of Imagawa Yos.h.i.+moto, was a negligible quant.i.ty. During many years, however, Ieyasu had to stand constantly on the defensive against Takeda s.h.i.+ngen. But, in 1572, s.h.i.+ngen and Ieyasu made a compact against the Imagawa, and this was followed by a successful campaign on the part of the Tokugawa leader against Ujizane. The agreement between s.h.i.+ngen and Ieyasu lasted only a short time. In November, 1572, s.h.i.+ngen led a large force and seized two of the Tokugawa castles, menacing the third and most important at Hamamatsu, where Ieyasu himself was in command. n.o.bunaga thereupon despatched an army to succour his ally, and in January, 1573, a series of b.l.o.o.d.y engagements took place outside Hamamatsu. One of n.o.bunaga's generals fled; another died in battle, and Ieyasu barely escaped into the castle, which he saved by a desperate device--leaving the gates open and thus suggesting to the enemy that they would be ambushed if they entered. This battle, known in history as the War of Mikata-ga-hara, was the greatest calamity that ever befell Ieyasu, and that he would have suffered worse things at the hands of Takeda s.h.i.+ngen cannot be doubted, had not s.h.i.+ngen's death taken place in May, 1573.
Various traditions have been handed down about the demise of this celebrated captain, undoubtedly one of the greatest strategists j.a.pan ever possessed. Some say that he was shot by a soldier of Ieyasu; others that he was..h.i.t by a stray bullet, but the best authorities agree that he died of illness. His son, Katsuyori,
This was in June, 1575, and on the news reaching n.o.bunaga, the latter lost no time in setting out to succour his ally. On the way a samurai named Torii Suneemon arrived from the garrison of Nagas.h.i.+no with news that unless succour were speedily given the fortress could not hold out. This message reached Ieyasu, who was awaiting the arrival of n.o.bunaga before marching to the relief of the beleagured fortress.
Ieyasu a.s.sured the messenger that help would come on the morrow, and urged Suneemon not to essay to re-enter the fortress. But the man declared that he must carry the tidings to his hard-set comrades. He was taken prisoner by the enemy and led into the presence of Katsuyori, who a.s.sured him that his life would be spared if he informed the inmates of the castle that no aid could be hoped for.
Suneemon simulated consent. Despatched under escort to the neighbourhood of the fort, he was permitted to address the garrison, and in a loud voice he shouted to his comrades that within a short time they might look for succour. He was immediately killed by his escort.
This dramatic episode became a household tradition in j.a.pan. Side by side with it may be set the fact that Hideyos.h.i.+, who accompanied n.o.bunaga in this campaign, employed successfully against the enemy one of the devices recommended by the Chinese strategists, whose books on the method of conducting warfare were closely studied in those days by the j.a.panese. Sak.u.ma n.o.b.u.mori, one of n.o.bunaga's captains, was openly, and of set purpose, insulted and beaten by orders of his general, and thereafter he escaped to the camp of the Takeda army, pretending that the evil treatment he had undergone was too much for his loyalty. Katsuyori, the Takeda commander, received the fugitive with open arms, and acting in accordance with his advice, disposed his troops in such a manner as to forfeit all the advantages of the position. The battle that ensued is memorable as the first historical instance of the use of firearms on any considerable scale in a j.a.panese campaign. n.o.bunaga's men took shelter themselves behind palisades and fusilladed the enemy so hotly that the old-fas.h.i.+oned hand-to-hand fighting became almost impossible. The losses of the Takeda men were enormous, and it may be said that the tactics of the era underwent radical alteration from that time, so that the fight at Takinosawa is memorable in j.a.panese history. Hideyos.h.i.+ urged the advisability of pus.h.i.+ng on at once to Katsuyori's capital, but n.o.bunaga hesitated to make such a call upon the energies of his troops, and the final overthrow of the Takeda chief was postponed.
MILITARY TACTICS
The Mongol invasion should have taught to the j.a.panese the great advantages of co-operating military units, but individual prowess continued to be the guiding factor of field tactics in j.a.pan down to the second half of the sixteenth century, when the introduction of firearms inspired new methods. j.a.panese historians have not much to say upon this subject. Indeed Rai Sanyo, in the Nihon-gwais.h.i.+, may almost be said to be the sole authority. He writes as follows: "The generals.h.i.+p of Takeda s.h.i.+ngen and Uesugi Kens.h.i.+n was something quite new in the country at their time. Prior to their day the art of manoeuvring troops had been little studied. Armies met, but each individual that composed them relied on his personal prowess and strength for victory. These two barons, however, made a special study of strategy and military tactics, with the result that they became authorities on the various methods of handling troops. In reference to the employment of cavalry, the Genji warriors and the first of the As.h.i.+kaga shoguns made use of horses largely, but in later days the As.h.i.+kaga did not move away from Kyoto and had no use for horses.
n.o.bunaga, being near Kyoto, and most of the wars in which he engaged involving no very long marches, relied almost solely on infantry.
Both Takeda and Uesugi were well supplied with mounted troops, but owing to the hilly nature of their territories, they made no special study of cavalry exercises and, almost invariably, the soldiers employed their horses solely for rapid movement from one place to another; when a battle commenced they alighted and fought on foot. It is therefore correct to say that at this time cavalry had gone out of use. Bows and arrows were, of course, superseded when firearms came into use.
"Thenceforth, the gun and the long spear were the chief weapons relied on. Peasants did not rank as soldiers, but their services were variously utilized in time of war. They were trained in the use of muskets, and of bows and arrows on hunting expeditions, and thus, when hostilities broke out, they were able to render considerable a.s.sistance in the defense of their houses. Highwaymen were frequently employed as spies and scouts. Both Takeda and Uesugi sanctioned this practice. These two generals also agreed in approving the following tactical arrangement: the van-guard, consisting of musketeers, artillerymen, and archers, was followed by companies of infantry armed with long spears. Then came the cavalry, and after them the main body, attached to which were drummers and conch-blowers. The whole army was divided into right and left wings, and a body of men was kept in reserve. At the opening of the battle, the hors.e.m.e.n dismounted and advanced on foot. This order was occasionally modified to suit altered circ.u.mstances, but as a rule, it was strictly followed."*
*Quoted by W. Dening in A New Life of Hideyos.h.i.+.
The artillery mentioned in the above quotation must be taken in a strictly limited sense. Indeed, it would be more correct to speak of heavy muskets, for cannon, properly so called, may scarcely be said to have formed any part of the equipment of a j.a.panese army until modern times. When the Portuguese discovered j.a.pan, in 1542, they introduced the musket to the j.a.panese, and the weapon was long known as Tanegas.h.i.+ma, that being the name of the island where the Portuguese s.h.i.+p first touched. Thenceforth, the manufacture of firearms was carried on with more or less success at various places, especially Sakai in Izumi and Negoro in Kii. "Small guns" (kozutsu) and "large guns" (ozutsu) are mentioned in the annals of the time, but by ozutsuwe must understand muskets of large calibre rather than cannon.
INVASION OF CHUGOKU.
At this time nearly the whole of central j.a.pan (Chugoku) was under the sway of Mori Terumoto, who succeeded his grandfather, Motonari, head of the great Mori family and ancestor of the present Prince Mori. One of these central provinces, namely, Harima, had just been the scene of a revolt which Hideyos.h.i.+ crushed by his wonted combination of cajolery and conquest. The ease with which this feat was accomplished and the expediency of maintaining the sequence of successes induced Hideyos.h.i.+ to propose that the subjugation of the whole of central j.a.pan should be entrusted to him and that he should be allowed to adopt n.o.bunaga's second son, Hidekatsu, to whom the rule of Chugoku should be entrusted, Hideyos.h.i.+ keeping for himself only the outlying portions. n.o.bunaga readily agreed, and, in 1577, Hideyos.h.i.+ set out on this important expedition, with a force of some ten thousand men, all fully equipped and highly trained. It is noteworthy that, before leaving Azuchi, Hideyos.h.i.+ declared to n.o.bunaga his intention of conquering Kyushu after the reduction of Chugoku, and thereafter he announced his purpose of crossing to Korea and making that country the basis of a campaign against China. "When that is effected," Hideyos.h.i.+ is quoted as saying, "the three countries, China, Korea, and j.a.pan, will be one. I shall do it all as easily as a man rolls up a piece of matting and carries it under his arm."
It is evident from these words that the project of invading Korea and China was entertained by Hideyos.h.i.+ nearly twenty years before--as will presently be seen--he attempted to carry it into practice.
Hideyos.h.i.+ marched in the first place to Harima, where his operations were so vigorous and so successful that Ukita Naoiye, who held the neighbouring provinces of Bizen and Mimasaka under the suzerainty of Mori Terumoto, espoused n.o.bunaga's cause without fighting. It is unnecessary to follow the details of the campaign that ensued. It lasted for five years, and ended in the subjection of as many provinces, namely, Harima, Tamba, Tango, Tajima, and Inaba. Hideyos.h.i.+ then returned to Azuchi and presented to n.o.bunaga an immense quant.i.ty of spolia opima which are said to have exceeded five thousand in number and to have covered all the ground around the castle.
DESTRUCTION OF THE TAKEDA
Shortly before Hideyos.h.i.+'s triumphant return from his first brilliant campaign in the central provinces, a memorable event occurred in Kai.
n.o.bunaga's eldest son, n.o.butada, uniting his forces with those of Ieyasu, completely destroyed the army of Takeda Katsuyori at Temmoku-zan, in the province of Kai. So thorough was the victory that Katsuyori and his son both committed suicide. n.o.bunaga then gave the province of Suruga to Ieyasu, and divided s.h.i.+nano and Kotsuke into manors, which were distributed among the Owari generals as rewards.
Takigawa Kazumasu was nominated kwanryo of the Kwanto, chiefly in order to watch and restrain the movements of the Hojo family, now the only formidable enemy of n.o.bunaga in the east.
RESUMPTION OF THE CHUGOKU CAMPAIGN
After a brief rest, Hideyos.h.i.+ again left Kyoto for the central provinces. He commenced operations on this second occasion by invading the island of Awaji, and having reduced it, he pa.s.sed on to b.i.t.c.hu, where he invested the important castle of Takamatsu, then under the command of s.h.i.+mizu Muneharu. This stronghold was so well planned and had such great natural advantages that Hideyos.h.i.+ abstained from any attempt to carry it by a.s.sault, and had recourse to the device of damming and banking a river so as to flood the fortress. About two miles and a half of embankment had to be made, and during the progress of the work, Mori Terumoto, who had been conducting a campaign elsewhere, found time to march a strong army to the relief of Takamatsu. But Terumoto, acting on the advice of his best generals, refrained from attacking Hideyos.h.i.+'s army. He sought rather to invite an onset from Hideyos.h.i.+, so that, during the progress of the combat, the garrison might find an opportunity to destroy the embankment. Hideyos.h.i.+, however, was much too astute to be tempted by such tactics. He saw that the fate of the castle must be sealed in a few days, and he refrained from any offensive movement.
But, in order to gratify n.o.bunaga by simulating need of his a.s.sistance, a despatch was sent to Azuchi begging him to come and personally direct the capture of the fort and the shattering of Terumoto's army.
a.s.sa.s.sINATION OF n.o.bUNAGA
Among n.o.bunaga's va.s.sal barons at that time was Akechi Mitsuhide. A scion of the ill.u.s.trious family of Seiwa Genji, Mitsuhide had served under several suzerains prior to 1566, when he repaired to Gifu and offered his sword to n.o.bunaga. Five years afterwards he received a fief of one hundred thousand koku and the t.i.tle of Hyuga no Kami.
This rapid promotion made him n.o.bunaga's debtor, but a shocking event, which occurred in 1577, seems to have inspired him with the deepest resentment against his patron. Mitsuhide, besieging the castle of Yakami in Tamba province, promised quarter to the brothers Hatano, who commanded its defence, and gave his own mother as hostage. But n.o.bunaga, disregarding this promise, put the Hatano brothers to the sword, and the latter's adherents avenged themselves by slaughtering Mitsuhide's mother. The best informed belief is that this incident converted Mitsuhide into n.o.bunaga's bitter enemy, and that the spirit of revenge was fostered by insults to which n.o.bunaga, always pa.s.sionate and rough, publicly subjected Mitsuhide. At all events, when, as stated above, Hideyos.h.i.+'s message of invitation reached n.o.bunaga at Azuchi, the latter gave orders for the despatch of a strong force to Takamatsu, one body, consisting of some thirty thousand men, being placed under the command of Mitsuhide. n.o.bunaga himself repaired to Kyoto and took up his quarters at the temple Honno-ji, whence he intended to follow his armies to the central provinces.
Mitsuhide concluded that his opportunity had now come. He determined to kill n.o.bunaga, and then to join hands with Mori Terumoto. He made known his design to a few of his retainers, and these attempted fruitlessly to dissuade him, but, seeing that his resolution was irrevocable, they agreed to a.s.sist him. The troops were duly a.s.sembled and put in motion, but instead of taking the road westward, they received an unexpected intimation, "The enemy is in Honno-ji,"
and their route was altered accordingly. n.o.bunaga defended himself valiantly. But being at last severely wounded and recognizing the hopelessness of resistance, he set fire to the temple and committed suicide, his fourteen-year-old son, Katsunaga, peris.h.i.+ng with him.
His eldest son, n.o.butada, who had just returned from the campaign in the east, followed his father to Kyoto, and was sojourning in the temple Myogaku-ji when news reached him of Mitsuhide's treachery. He attempted to succour his father, but arrived too late. Then he repaired to the Nijo palace and, having entrusted his infant son to the care of Maeda Gen-i with instructions to carry him to Kiyosu, he made preparation for defence against Mitsuhide. Finally, overwhelmed by numbers, he killed himself, and his example was followed by ninety of his retainers. Mitsuhide then proceeded to Azuchi and having pillaged the castle, returned to Kyoto, where he was received in audience by the Emperor, and he then took the t.i.tle of shogun.
AFTER THE a.s.sa.s.sINATION
n.o.bunaga was a.s.sa.s.sinated on the second day of the sixth month, according to j.a.panese reckoning. News of the event reached the camp of the besiegers of Takamatsu almost immediately, but a messenger sent by Mitsuhide to convey the intelligence to Mori and to solicit his alliance was intercepted by Hideyos.h.i.+'s men. A great deal of historical confusion envelops immediately subsequent events, but the facts seem simple enough. Hideyos.h.i.+ found himself in a position of great difficulty. His presence in Kyoto was almost a necessity, yet he could not withdraw from Takamatsu without sacrificing all the fruits of the campaign in the west and exposing himself to a probably disastrous attack by Mori's army. In this emergency he acted with his usual talent. Summoning a famous priest, Ekei, of a temple in Aki, who enjoyed the confidence of all parties, he despatched him to Mori's camp with proposals for peace and for the delimitation of the frontiers of Mori and n.o.bunaga, on condition that the castle of Takamatsu should be surrendered and the head of its commander, s.h.i.+mizu Muneharu, presented to his conquerer.
Mori was acting entirely by the advice of his two uncles, Kikkawa and Kohayakawa, both men of profound insight. They fully admitted the desirability of peace, since Hideyos.h.i.+'s army effectually commanded the communications between the eastern and western parts of Chugoku, but they resolutely rejected the notion of sacrificing the life of s.h.i.+mizu on the altar of any compact. When the priest carried this answer to Hideyos.h.i.+, the latter suggested, as the only recourse, that s.h.i.+mizu himself should be consulted. Ekei accordingly repaired to the castle and explained the situation to its commandant. s.h.i.+mizu had not a moment's hesitation. He declared himself more than willing to die for the sake of his liege-lord and his comrades, and he asked only that fish and wine, to give the garrison the rare treat of a good meal, should be furnished. On the 5th of the sixth month this agreement was carried into effect. s.h.i.+mizu committed suicide, the compact between Mori and Hideyos.h.i.+ was signed, and the latter, striking his camp, prepared to set out for Kyoto. It was then for the first time that Mori and his generals learned of the death of n.o.bunaga. Immediately there was an outcry in favour of disregarding the compact and falling upon the enemy in his retreat; but Kikkawa and Kohayakawa stubbornly opposed anything of the kind. They declared that such a course would disgrace the house of Mori, whereas, by keeping faith, the friends.h.i.+p of Hideyos.h.i.+ and his fellow barons would be secured. Accordingly the withdrawal was allowed to take place unmolested.
IEYASU
The life of the Tokugawa chieftain was placed in great jeopardy by the Mitsuhide incident. After being brilliantly received by n.o.bunaga at Azuchi, Ieyasu, at his host's suggestion, had made a sightseeing excursion to Kyoto, whence he prolonged his journey to Osaka and finally to Sakai. The news of the catastrophe reached him at the last-named place, and his immediate impulse was to be avenged upon the a.s.sa.s.sin. But it was pointed out to him that his following was much too small for such an enterprise, and he therefore decided to set out for the east immediately. Mitsuhide, well aware of the Tokugawa baron's unfriendliness, made strenuous efforts to waylay Ieyasu on the way, and with great difficulty the journey eastward was accomplished by avoiding all the highroads.
n.o.bUNAGA
n.o.bunaga perished at the age of forty-nine. The great faults of his character seem to have been want of discrimination in the treatment of his allies and his retainers, and want of patience in the conduct of affairs. In his eyes, a baron of high rank deserved no more consideration than a humble retainer, and he often gave offence which disturbed the achievement of his plans. As for his impetuousness, his character has been well depicted side by side with that of Hideyos.h.i.+ and Ieyasu in three couplets familiar to all j.a.panese. These couplets represent n.o.bunaga as saying:
Nakaneba korosu Hototogisu.
(I'll kill the cuckoo If if it won't sing)
By Hideyos.h.i.+ the same idea is conveyed thus:--
Nakas.h.i.+te miyo Hototogisu.
(I'll try to make the cuckoo sing.)