Chapter 61
It is recorded that n.o.bunaga's demeanour in battle truly reflected the spirit of these verses.
ENGRAVING: TOYOTOMI HIDEYOs.h.i.+
HIDEYOs.h.i.+
n.o.bunaga certainly deserved the success he achieved, but that he achieved it must be attributed in part to accident. That accident was his a.s.sociation with Hideyos.h.i.+.* It has been sometimes said that circ.u.mstances beget the men to deal with them. Fallacious as such a doctrine is, it almost compels belief when we observe that the second half of the sixteenth century in j.a.pan produced three of the greatest men the world has ever seen, and that they joined hands to accomplish the stupendous task of restoring peace and order to an empire which had been almost continuously torn by war throughout five consecutive centuries. These three men were born within an interval of eight years: n.o.bunaga, in 1534; Hideyos.h.i.+, in 1536, and Ieyasu, in 1542.
*To avoid needless difficulty the name "Hideyos.h.i.+" is used solely throughout this history. But, as a matter of fact, the great statesman and general was called in his childhood Nakamura Hiyos.h.i.+; his adult name was Tokichi; afterwards he changed this to Has.h.i.+ba and ultimately, he was known as Toyotomi Hideyos.h.i.+.
There are many stories about Hideyos.h.i.+'s early days, but the details are obscured by a record called the Taikoki, which undoubtedly makes many excursions into the region of romance. The plain facts appear to be that Hideyos.h.i.+ was the son of a humble farmer named Kinos.h.i.+ta Yaemon, who lived in the Aichi district of Owari province, and who preferred the life of a foot-soldier (as.h.i.+garu) to the pursuit of agriculture. Yaemon served the Oda family, and died when Hideyos.h.i.+ was still a youth. In Owari province, at a homestead called Icho-mura from the name of the tree (maiden-hair tree) that flourishes there in abundance, there stands a temple built in the year 1616 on the site of the house where Hideyos.h.i.+ was born. This temple is known as Taiko-zan--"Taiko" having been the t.i.tle of Hideyos.h.i.+ in the latter years of his life--and in the grounds of the temple may be seen the well from which water was drawn to wash the newly born baby. The child grew up to be a youth of dimunitive stature, monkey-like face, extraordinary precocity, and boundless ambition. Everything was against him--personal appearance, obscurity of lineage, and absence of scholars.h.i.+p. Yet he never seems to have doubted that a great future lay before him.
Many curious legends are grouped about his childhood. They are for the most part clumsily constructed and unconvincing, though probably we shall be justified in accepting the evidence they bear of a mind singularly well ordered and resourceful. At the age of sixteen he was employed by a Buddhist priest to a.s.sist in distributing amulets, and by the agency of this priest he obtained an introduction to Matsus.h.i.+ta Yukitsuna, commandant of the castle of Kuno at Hamamatsu, in Totomi province. This Matsus.h.i.+ta was a va.s.sal of Imagawa Yos.h.i.+moto. He controlled the provinces of Mikawa, Totomi, and Suruga, which lie along the coast eastward of Owari, and he represented one of the most powerful families in the country. Hideyos.h.i.+ served in the castle of Kuno for a period variously reckoned at from one year to five. Tradition says that he abused the trust placed in him by his employer, and absconded with the sum of six ryo wherewith he had been commissioned to purchase a new kind of armour which had recently come into vogue in Owari province. But though this alleged theft becomes in certain annals the basis of a picturesque story as to Hideyos.h.i.+ repaying Matsus.h.i.+ta a thousandfold in later years, the unadorned truth seems to be that Hideyos.h.i.+ was obliged to leave Kuno on account of the jealousy of his fellow retainers, who slandered him to Yukitsuna and procured his dismissal.
Returning to Owari, he obtained admission to the ranks of Oda n.o.bunaga in the humble capacity of sandal-bearer. He deliberately chose n.o.bunaga through faith in the greatness of his destiny, and again the reader of j.a.panese history is confronted by ingenious tales as to Hideyos.h.i.+'s devices for obtaining admission to n.o.bunaga's house. But the most credible explanation is, at the same time, the simplest, namely, that Hideyos.h.i.+'s father, having been borne on the military roll of n.o.bunaga's father, little difficulty offered in obtaining a similar favour for Hideyos.h.i.+.
n.o.bunaga was then on the threshold of his brilliant career. In those days of perpetual war and tumult, the supreme ambition of each great territorial baron in j.a.pan was to fight his way to the capital, there to obtain from the sovereign and the Muromachi Bakufu a commission to subdue the whole country and to administer it as their lieutenant.
n.o.bunaga seems to have cherished that hope from his early years, though several much more powerful military magnates would surely oppose anything like his pre-eminence. Moreover, in addition to comparative weakness, he was hampered by local inconvenience. The province of Owari was guarded on the south by sea, but on the east it was menaced directly by the Imagawa family and indirectly by the celebrated Takeda s.h.i.+ngen, while on the north it was threatened by the Saito and on the west by the Asai, the Sasaki, and the Kitabatake. Any one of these puissant feudatories would have been more than a match for the Owari chieftain, and that Imagawa Yos.h.i.+moto harboured designs against Owari was well known to n.o.bunaga, for in those days spying, slander, forgery, and deceit of every kind had the approval of the Chinese writers on military ethics whose books were regarded as cla.s.sics by the j.a.panese. Hideyos.h.i.+ himself figures at this very time as the instigator and director of a series of acts of extreme treachery, by which the death of one of the princ.i.p.al Imagawa va.s.sals was compa.s.sed; and the same Hideyos.h.i.+ was the means of discovering a plot by Imagawa emissaries to delay the repair of the castle of Kiyosu, n.o.bunaga's headquarters, where a heavy fall of rain had caused a landslide. n.o.bunaga did not venture to a.s.sume the offensive against the Imagawa chief. He chose as a matter of necessity to stand on the defensive, and when it became certain that Imagawa Yos.h.i.+moto had taken the field, a general impression prevailed that the destruction of the Oda family was unavoidable.
BATTLE OF OKEHAZAMA
In the month of June, 1560, Imagawa Yos.h.i.+moto crossed the border into Owari at the head of a force stated by the annals to have been forty-six thousand strong. Just two years had elapsed since Hideyos.h.i.+'s admission to the service of the Owari baron in the office of sandal-bearer. Nevertheless, some generally credible records do not hesitate to represent Hideyos.h.i.+ as taking a prominent part in the great battle against the Imagawa, and as openly advising n.o.bunaga with regard to the strategy best adapted to the situation. It is incredible that a private soldier, and a mere youth of twenty-two at that, should have risen in such a short time to occupy a place of equality with the great generals of n.o.bunaga's army. But that Hideyos.h.i.+ contributed more or less to the result of the fight may be confidently a.s.serted.
The battle itself, though the forces engaged were not large, must be counted one of the great combats of the world, for had not n.o.bunaga emerged victorious the whole course of j.a.panese history might have been changed. At the outset, no definite programme seems to have been conceived on n.o.bunaga's side. He had no allies, and the numerical inferiority of his troops was overwhelming. The latter defect was remedied in a very partial degree by the resourcefulness of Hideyos.h.i.+. In his boyhood he had served for some time under a celebrated chief of freebooters, by name Hachisuka Koroku,* and he persuaded that chieftain with his fifteen hundred followers to march to the aid of the Owari army, armour and weapons having been furnished by Sasaki Shotei, of Omi province. Sasaki regarded n.o.bunaga's plight as too hopeless to warrant direct aid, but he was willing to equip Hachisuka's men for the purpose, although the addition of fifteen hundred soldiers could make very little difference in the face of such a disparity as existed between the combatants.
*Ancestor of the present Marquis Hachisuka.
Shortly before these events, Owari had been invaded from the west by the Kitabatake baron, whose domain lay in Ise, and the invaders had been beaten back by a bold offensive movement on n.o.bunaga's part. The ultimate result had not been conclusive, as n.o.bunaga advisedly refrained from carrying the war into Ise and thus leaving his own territory unguarded. But the affair had taught the superiority of offensive tactics, and thus n.o.bunaga's impulse was to attack the army of Imagawa, instead of waiting to be crushed by preponderate force.
His most trusted generals, s.h.i.+bata Katsuiye, Sak.u.ma n.o.b.u.mori, and Hayas.h.i.+ Mitsukatsu, strenuously opposed this plan. They saw no prospect whatever of success in a.s.suming the offensive against strength so superior, and they urged the advisability of yielding temporarily and awaiting an opportunity to recover independence.
Here, Hideyos.h.i.+ is reputed to have shown conspicuous wisdom at the council-table. He pointed out that there could be no such thing as temporary surrender. The Imagawa would certainly insist on hostages sufficiently valuable to insure permanent good faith, and he further declared that it was a mistake to credit the Imagawa with possessing the good-will of any of the other great feudatories, since they were all equally jealous of one another.
Finally, it was resolved that seven forts should be built and garrisoned, and that five of them should be allowed to fall into the enemy's hands if resistance proved hopeless. In the remaining two forts the garrisons were to be composed of the best troops in the Owari army, and over these strongholds were to be flown the flags of n.o.bunaga himself and of his chief general. It was hoped that by their success in five of the forts the Imagawa army would be at once physically wearied and morally encouraged to concentrate their entire strength and attention on the capture of the last two fortresses.
Meanwhile, n.o.bunaga himself, with a select body of troops, was to march by mountain roads to the rear of the invading forces and deliver a furious attack when such a manoeuvre was least expected.
The brave men who engaged in this perilous enterprise were strengthened by wors.h.i.+pping at the shrine of Hachiman in the village of Atsuta, and their prayers evoked appearances which were interpreted as manifestations of divine a.s.sistance. Most fortunately for the Owari troops, their movements were shrouded by a heavy rainfall, and they succeeded in inflicting serious loss on the invading army, driving it pele-mele across the border and killing its chief, Yos.h.i.+moto. No attempt was made to pursue the fugitives into Mikawa. n.o.bunaga was prudently content with his signal victory. It raised him at once to a level with the greatest provincial barons in the empire, and placed him in the foremost rank of the aspirants for an Imperial commission.
ENGRAVING: TOKUGAWA IEYASU
TOKUGAWA IEYASU
The battle of Okehazama led to another incident of prime importance in j.a.panese history. It brought about an alliance between Oda n.o.bunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu. Among the small barons subject to the Imagawa there was one called Matsudaira Motoyasu. He had taken the name, Motoyasu, by adopting one of the ideographs of Yos.h.i.+moto's appellation. His family, long in alliance with the Imagawa, were at a variance with the Oda, and in the battle of Okehazama this Motoyasu had captured one of the Owari forts. But
n.o.bUNAGA'S POSITION
It was at this time, according to j.a.panese annalists, that n.o.bunaga seriously conceived the ambition of making Kyoto his goal. The situation offered inducements. In the presence of a practically acknowledged conviction that no territorial baron of that era might venture to engage in an enterprise which denuded his territory of a protecting army, it was necessary to look around carefully before embarking upon the Kyoto project. n.o.bunaga had crushed the Imagawa, for though his victory had not been conclusive from a military point of view, it had placed the Imagawa under incompetent leaders.h.i.+p and had thus freed Owari from all menace from the littoral provinces on the east. Again, in the direction of Echigo and s.h.i.+nano, the great captain, Uesugi Kens.h.i.+n, dared not strike at n.o.bunaga's province without exposing himself to attack from Takeda s.h.i.+ngen. But s.h.i.+ngen was not reciprocally hampered. His potentialities were always an unknown quality. He was universally recognized as the greatest strategist of his time, and if n.o.bunaga ventured to move westward, the Kai baron would probably seize the occasion to lay hands upon Owari. It is true that the alliance with Tokugawa Ieyasu const.i.tuted some protection. But Ieyasu was no match for s.h.i.+ngen in the field.
Some other check must be devised, and n.o.bunaga found it in the marriage of his adopted daughter to s.h.i.+ngen's son, Katsuyori.
THE COURT APPEALS TO n.o.bUNAGA
In Kyoto, at this time, a state of great confusion existed. The Emperor Okimachi had ascended the throne in 1557. But in the presence of the violent usurpations of the Miyos.h.i.+ and others, neither the sovereign nor the shogun could exercise any authority, and, as has been shown already, the Throne was constantly in pecuniarily embara.s.sed circ.u.mstances. n.o.bunaga's father, n.o.buhide, had distinguished himself by subscribing liberally to aid the Court financially, and this fact being now recalled in the context of n.o.bunaga's rapidly rising power, the Emperor, in the year 1562, despatched Tachiri Munetsugu nominally to wors.h.i.+p at the shrine of Atsuta, but in reality to convey to n.o.bunaga an Imperial message directing him to restore order in the capital. The Owari baron received this envoy with marked respect. It is recorded that he solemnly performed the ceremony of l.u.s.tration and clothed himself in hitherto unworn garments on the occasion of his interview with the envoy. It was not in his power, however, to make any definite arrangement as to time. He could only profess his humble determination to obey the Imperial behest, and promise the utmost expedition. But there can be no doubt that the arrival of this envoy decided the question of a march to Kyoto, though some years were destined to elapse before the project could be carried out.
Two things were necessary, however, namely, a feasible route and a plausible pretext. Even in those times, when wars were often undertaken merely for the purpose of deciding personal supremacy, there remained sufficient public morality to condemn any baron who suffered himself to be guided openly by ambition alone. Some reasonably decent cause had to be found. Now the Emperor, though, as above stated, communicating his will verbally to n.o.bunaga, had not sent him any written commission. The necessary pretext was furnished, however, by the relations between the members of the Saito family of Mino province, which lay upon the immediate north of Owari, and const.i.tuted the most convenient road to Kyoto. Hidetatsu, the head of that family, had fought against n.o.bunaga's father, n.o.buhide, and one of the conditions of peace had been that the daughter of Hidetatsu should become the wife of n.o.bunaga.
Subsequently, the Saito household was disturbed by one of the family feuds so common during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in j.a.pan. Hidetatsu, desiring to disinherit his eldest son, Yos.h.i.+tatsu, had been attacked and killed by the latter, and n.o.bunaga announced his intention of avenging the death of his father-in-law. But before this intention could be carried out, Yos.h.i.+tatsu died (1561), and his son, Tatsuoki, a man of little resource or ability, had to bear the onset from Owari. n.o.bunaga, at the head of a large force, crossed the Kiso River into Mino. But he found that, even under the leaders.h.i.+p of Tatsuoki, the Mino men were too strong for him, and he was ultimately compelled to adopt the device of erecting on the Mino side of the river a fortress which should serve at once as a basis of military operations and as a place for establis.h.i.+ng relations with the minor families in the province. The building of this fort proved a very difficult task, but it was finally accomplished by a clever device on the part of Hideyos.h.i.+, who, a master of intrigue as well as of military strategy, subsequently won over to n.o.bunaga's cause many of the princ.i.p.al va.s.sals of the Saito family, among them being Takenaka s.h.i.+geharu, who afterwards proved a most capable lieutenant to Hideyos.h.i.+.
These preliminaries arranged, n.o.bunaga once more crossed the Kiso (1564) at the head of a large army, and after many days of severe fighting, captured the castle of Inaba-yama, which had been strongly fortified by Yos.h.i.+tatsu, and was deemed impregnable. n.o.bunaga established his headquarters at this castle, changing its name to Gifu, and thus extending his dominion over the province of Mino as well as Owari. He had now to consider whether he would push on at once into the province of Omi, which alone lay between him and Kyoto, or whether he would first provide against the danger of a possible attack on the western littoral of Owari from the direction of Ise. He chose the latter course, and invaded Ise at the head of a considerable force. But he here met with a repulse at the hands of Kusunoki Masatomo, who to the courage and loyalty of his immortal ancestor, Masas.h.i.+ge, added no small measure of strategical ability.
He succeeded in defending his castle of Yada against n.o.bunaga's attacks, and finally the Owari general, deceived by a rumour to the effect that Takeda s.h.i.+ngen had reached the neighbourhood of Gifu with a strong army, retired hurriedly from Ise.
It may here be mentioned that three years later, in 1568, Hideyos.h.i.+ succeeded in inducing all the territorial n.o.bles of northern Ise, except Kusunoki Masatomo, to place themselves peacefully under n.o.bunaga's sway. Hideyos.h.i.+'s history shows him to have been a constant believer in the theory that a conquered foe generally remains an enemy, whereas a conciliated enemy often becomes a friend.
Acting on this conviction and aided by an extraordinary gift of persuasive eloquence, he often won great victories without any bloodshed. Thus he succeeded in convincing the Ise barons that n.o.bunaga was not swayed by personal ambition, but that his ruling desire was to put an end to the wars which had devastated j.a.pan continuously for more than a century. It is right to record that the failures made by n.o.bunaga himself in his Ise campaign were in the sequel of measures taken in opposition to Hideyos.h.i.+'s advice, and indeed the annals show that this was true of nearly all the disasters that overtook n.o.bunaga throughout his career, whereas his many and brilliant successes were generally the outcome of Hideyos.h.i.+'s counsels.
ANOTHER SUMMONS FROM THE EMPEROR
In November, 1567, the Emperor again sent Tachiri Munetsugu to invite n.o.bunaga's presence in Kyoto. His Majesty still refrained from the dangerous step of giving a written commission to n.o.bunaga, but he instructed Munetsugu to carry to the Owari chieftain a suit of armour and a sword. Two years previously to this event, the tumult in Kyoto had culminated in an attack on the palace of the shogun Yos.h.i.+teru, the conflagration of the building, and the suicide of the shogun amid the blazing ruins. Yos.h.i.+teru's younger brother, Yos.h.i.+aki, effected his escape from the capital, and wandered about the country during three years, supplicating one baron after another to take up his cause. This was in 1568, just nine months after the Emperor's second message to n.o.bunaga, and the latter, acting upon Hideyos.h.i.+'s advice, determined to become Yos.h.i.+aki's champion, since by so doing he would represent not only the sovereign but also the shogun in the eyes of the nation. Meanwhile--and this step also was undertaken under Hideyos.h.i.+'s advice--a friendly contract had been concluded with Asai Nagamasa, the most powerful baron in Omi, and the agreement had been cemented by the marriage of n.o.bunaga's sister to Nagamasa.
n.o.bUNAGA PROCEEDS TO KYOTO
In October, 1568, n.o.bunaga set out for Kyoto at the head of an army said to have numbered thirty thousand. He did not encounter any serious resistance on the way, but the coming of his troops threw the city into consternation, the general apprehension being that the advent of these provincial warriors would preface a series of depredations such as the people were only too well accustomed to. But n.o.bunaga lost no time in issuing rea.s.suring proclamations, which, in the sequel, his officers proved themselves thoroughly capable of enforcing, and before the year closed peace and order were restored in the capital, Yos.h.i.+aki being nominated shogun and all the ceremonies of Court life being restored. Subsequently, the forces of the Miyos.h.i.+ sept made armed attempts to recover the control of the city, and the shogun asked n.o.bunaga to appoint one of his most trusted generals and ablest administrators to maintain peace. It was fully expected that n.o.bunaga would respond to this appeal by nominating s.h.i.+bata, Sak.u.ma, or Niwa, who had served under his banners from the outset, and in whose eyes Hideyos.h.i.+ was a mere upstart. But n.o.bunaga selected Hideyos.h.i.+, and the result justified his choice, for during Hideyos.h.i.+'s sway Kyoto enjoyed such tranquillity as it had not known for a century.
n.o.bunaga omitted nothing that could make for the dignity and comfort of the new shogun. He caused a palace to be erected for him on the site of the former Nijo Castle, contributions being levied for the purpose on the five provinces of the Kinai as well as on six others; and n.o.bunaga himself personally supervised the work, which was completed in May, 1569. But it may fairly be doubted whether n.o.bunaga acted in all this matter with sincerity. At the outset his att.i.tude towards the shogun was so respectful and so considerate that Yos.h.i.+aki learned to regard and speak of him as a father. But presently n.o.bunaga presented a memorial, charging the shogun with faults which were set forth in seventeen articles. In this impeachment, Yos.h.i.+aki was accused of neglecting his duties at Court; of failing to propitiate the territorial n.o.bles; of partiality in meting out rewards and punishments; of arbitrarily confiscating private property; of squandering money on needless enterprises; of listening to flatterers; of going abroad in the disguise of a private person, and so forth. It is claimed by some of n.o.bunaga's biographers that he was perfectly honest in presenting this memorial, but others, whose judgment appears to be more perspicacious, consider that his chief object was to discredit Yos.h.i.+aki and thus make room for his own subsequent succession to the shogunate.
At all events Yos.h.i.+aki interpreted the memorial in that sense. He became openly hostile to n.o.bunaga, and ultimately took up arms.
n.o.bunaga made many attempts to conciliate him. He even sent Hideyos.h.i.+ to solicit Yos.h.i.+aki's return to Kyoto from Kawachi whither the shogun had fled. But Yos.h.i.+aki, declining to be placated, placed himself under the protection of the Mori family, and thus from the year 1573, n.o.bunaga became actual wielder of the shogun's authority. Ten years later, Yos.h.i.+aki returned to the capital, took the tonsure and changed his name to Shozan. At the suggestion of Hideyos.h.i.+ a t.i.tle and a yearly income of ten thousand koku were conferred on him. He died in Osaka and thus ended the As.h.i.+kaga shogunate.
SAKAI
One of the incidents connected with Hideyos.h.i.+'s administration in Kyoto ill.u.s.trates the customs of his time. Within eight miles of the city of Osaka lies Sakai, a great manufacturing mart. This latter town, though originally forming part of the As.h.i.+kaga domain, nevertheless a.s.sisted the Miyos.h.i.+ in their attack upon the shogunate.
n.o.bunaga, much enraged at such action, proposed to sack the town, but Hideyos.h.i.+ asked to have the matter left in his hands. This request being granted, he sent messengers to Sakai, who informed the citizens that n.o.bunaga contemplated the destruction of the town by fire.
Thereupon the citizens, preferring to die sword in hand rather than to be cremated, built forts and made preparations for resistance.
This was just what Hideyos.h.i.+ designed. Disguising himself, he repaired to Sakai and asked to be informed as to the object of these military preparations. Learning the apprehensions of the people, he ridiculed their fears; declared that n.o.bunaga had for prime object the safety and peace of the realm, and that by giving ear to such wild rumours and a.s.suming a defiant att.i.tude, they had committed a fault not to be lightly condoned. Delegates were then sent from Sakai at Hideyos.h.i.+'s suggestion to explain the facts to n.o.bunaga, who acted his part in the drama by ordering the deputies to be thrown into prison and promising to execute them as well as their fellow townsmen. In this strait the people of Sakai appealed to a celebrated Buddhist priest named Kennyo, and through his intercession Hideyos.h.i.+ agreed to ransom the town for a payment of twenty thousand ryo. The funds thus obtained were devoted to the repair of the palaces of the Emperor and the shogun, a measure which won for n.o.bunaga the applause of the whole of Kyoto.
n.o.bUNAGA'S SITUATION
Oda n.o.bunaga was now in fact shogun. So far as concerned legalized power he had no equal in the empire, but his military strength was by no means proportionate. In the north, in the east, in the west, and in the south, there were great territorial n.o.bles who could put into the field armies much larger than all the Owari chief's troops.
Takeda s.h.i.+ngen, in the Kwanto, was the most formidable of these opponents. In the year 1570, when the events now to be related occurred, the Hojo sept was under the rule of Ujimasa, and with him s.h.i.+ngen had concluded an alliance which rendered the latter secure against attack on the rear in the event of movement against Kyoto.
The better to ensure himself against Hojo designs, s.h.i.+ngen joined hands with the Satomi family in Awa, and the Satake family in Hitachi; while to provide against irruptions by the Uesugi family he enlisted the co-operation of the priests in Kaga, Echizen, and Noto.
s.h.i.+ngen further established relations of friends.h.i.+p with Matsunaga Hisahide in the far west. It was this baron that had attacked the palace of Nijo when Yos.h.i.+teru, the shogun, had to commit suicide, and s.h.i.+ngen's object in approaching him was to sow seeds of discord between the shogunate and n.o.bunaga. Most imminent of all perils, however, was the menace of the Asai family in Omi, and the Asakura family in Echizen. A glance at the map shows that the Asai were in a position to sever n.o.bunaga's communications with his base in Mino, and that the Asakura were in a position to cut off his communications with Kyoto. In this perilous situation n.o.bunaga's sole resource lay in Tokugawa Ieyasu and in the latter's alliance with the Uesugi, which compact the Owari chief spared no pains to solidify. But from a military point of view Ieyasu was incomparably weaker than s.h.i.+ngen.
THE STRUGGLE WITH THE ASAKURA AND THE ASAI
In 1570, n.o.bunaga determined to put his fortunes to a final test.
Having concentrated a large body of troops in Kyoto, he declared war against Asakura Yos.h.i.+kage, who had refused to recognize the new shogun. Success crowned the early efforts of the Owari forces in this war, but the whole situation was changed by Asai Nagamasa, who suddenly marched out of Omi and threatened to attack n.o.bunaga's rear.
It is true that before setting out for Kyoto originally, n.o.bunaga had given his sister in marriage to Nagamasa, and had thus invited the latter's friends.h.i.+p. But Nagamasa had always been on terms of close amity with Yos.h.i.+kage, and, indeed, had stipulated from the outset that n.o.bunaga should not make war against the latter. It cannot be said, therefore, that Nagamasa's move const.i.tuted a surprise.
n.o.bunaga should have been well prepared for such contingencies. He was not prepared, however, and the result was that he found himself menaced by Yos.h.i.+kage's army in front and by Nagamasa's in rear.
Tokugawa Ieyasu, who had a.s.sociated himself by invitation with this expedition into Echizen, advised n.o.bunaga to countermarch with all rapidity for Kyoto, and it was so determined. Hideyos.h.i.+ was left with three thousand men to hold Yos.h.i.+kage's forces in some degree of check.
The situation at that moment was well-nigh desperate. There seemed to be no hope for either n.o.bunaga or Hideyos.h.i.+. But n.o.bunaga was saved by the slowness of Nagamasa, who, had he moved with any rapidity, must have reached Kyoto in advance of n.o.bunaga's forces; and Hideyos.h.i.+ was saved by an exercise of the wonderful resourcefulness which peril always awoke in this great man. Calculating that Yos.h.i.+kage's army would reach Kanagasaki Castle at nightfall, Hideyos.h.i.+, by means of thousands of lanterns and banners gave to a few scores of men a semblance of a numerous army. Yos.h.i.+kage, who believed that n.o.bunaga had retired, was visited by doubts at the aspect of this great array, and instead of advancing to attack at once, he decided to await the morning. Meanwhile, Hideyos.h.i.+ with his little band of troops, moved round Yos.h.i.+kage's flank, and delivering a fierce attack at midnight, completely defeated the Echizen forces.*
*See A New Life of Toyolomi Hideyos.h.i.+, by W. Dening.