Benjamin Franklin

These Propositions appear to be the necessary Consequences of the former. And certainly no Reason can be given, why the Creator should prefer in his Esteem one Part of His Works to another, if with equal Wisdom and Goodness he design'd and created them all, since all Ill or Defect, as contrary to his Nature, is excluded by his Power. We will sum up the Argument thus, When the Creator first design'd the Universe, either it was His Will and Intention that all Things should exist and be in the Manner they are at this Time; or it was his Will they should _be_ otherwise, _i.e._ in a different Manner: To say it was His Will Things should be otherwise than they are, is to say Somewhat hath contradicted His Will, and broken His Measures, which is impossible because inconsistent with his Power; therefore we must allow that all Things exist now in a Manner agreeable to His Will, and in consequence of that are all equally Good, and therefore equally esteem'd by Him.

I proceed now to shew, that as all the Works of the Creator are equally esteem'd by Him, so they are, as in Justice they ought to be, equally us'd.

Sect. II. _Of_ Pleasure _and_ Pain.

I. _When a Creature is form'd and endu'd with Life, 'tis suppos'd to receive a Capacity of the Sensation of_ Uneasiness _or_ Pain.

It is this distinguishes Life and Consciousness from unactive unconscious Matter. To know or be sensible of Suffering or being acted upon is _to live_; and whatsoever is not so, among created Things, is properly and truly _dead_.

All _Pain_ and _Uneasiness_ proceeds at first from and is caus'd by Somewhat without and distinct from the Mind itself. The Soul must first be acted upon before it can re-act. In the Beginning of Infancy it is as if it were not; it is not conscious of its own Existence, till it has receiv'd the first Sensation of _Pain_; then, and not before, it begins to feel itself, is rous'd, and put into Action; then it discovers its Powers and Faculties, and exerts them to expel the Uneasiness. Thus is the Machine set on work; this is Life. We are first mov'd by _Pain_, and the whole succeeding Course of our Lives is but one continu'd Series of Action with a View to be freed from it. As fast as we have excluded one Uneasiness another appears, otherwise the Motion would cease. If a continual Weight is not apply'd, the Clock will stop. And as soon as the Avenues of Uneasiness to the Soul are choak'd up or cut off, we are dead, we think and act no more.

II. _This Uneasiness, whenever felt, produces_ Desire _to be freed from it, great in exact proportion to the Uneasiness._

Thus is _Uneasiness_ the first Spring and Cause of all Action; for till we are uneasy in Rest, we can have no Desire to move, and without Desire of moving there can be no voluntary Motion. The Experience of every Man who has observ'd his own Actions will evince the Truth of this; and I think nothing need be said to prove that the _Desire_ will be equal to the _Uneasiness_, for the very Thing implies as much: It is not _Uneasiness_ unless we desire to be freed from it, nor a great _Uneasiness_ unless the consequent Desire is great.

I might here observe, how necessary a Thing in the Order and Design of the Universe this _Pain_ or _Uneasiness_ is, and how beautiful in its Place! Let us but suppose it just now banish'd the World entirely, and consider the Consequence of it: All the Animal Creation would immediately stand stock still, exactly in the Posture they were in the Moment Uneasiness departed; not a Limb, not a Finger would henceforth move; we should all be reduc'd to the Condition of Statues, dull and unactive: Here I should continue to sit motionless with the Pen in my Hand thus------and neither leave my Seat nor write one Letter more. This may appear odd at first View, but a little Consideration will make it evident; for 'tis impossible to a.s.sign any other Cause for the voluntary Motion of an Animal than its _uneasiness_ in Rest. What a different Appearance then would the Face of Nature make, without it! How necessary is it! And how unlikely that the Inhabitants of the World ever were, or that the Creator ever design'd they should be, exempt from it!

I would likewise observe here, that the VIIIth Proposition in the preceding Section, viz. _That there is neither Merit nor Demerit_, &c.

is here again demonstrated, as infallibly, tho' in another manner: For since _Freedom from Uneasiness_ is the End of all our Actions, how is it possible for us to do any Thing disinterested?--How can any Action be meritorious of Praise or Dispraise, Reward or Punishment, when the natural Principle of _Self-Love_ is the only and the irresistible Motive to it?

III. _This_ Desire _is always fulfill'd or satisfy'd_,

In the _Design_ or _End_ of it, tho' not in the _Manner_: The first is requisite, the latter not. To exemplify this, let us make a Supposition; A Person is confin'd in a House which appears to be in imminent Danger of Falling, this, as soon as perceiv'd, creates a violent _Uneasiness_, and that instantly produces an equal strong _Desire_, the _End_ of which is _freedom from the Uneasiness_, and the _Manner_ or Way propos'd to gain this _End_, is _to get out of the House_. Now if he is convinc'd by any Means, that he is mistaken, and the House is not likely to fall, he is immediately freed from his _Uneasiness_, and the _End_ of his Desire is attain'd as well as if it had been in the _Manner_ desir'd, viz.

_leaving the House_.

All our different Desires and Pa.s.sions proceed from and are reducible to this one Point, _Uneasiness_, tho' the Means we propose to ourselves for expelling of it are infinite. One proposes _Fame_, another _Wealth_, a third _Power_, &c. as the Means to gain this _End_; but tho' these are never attain'd, if the Uneasiness be remov'd by some other Means, the _Desire_ is satisfy'd. Now during the Course of Life we are ourselves continually removing successive Uneasinesses as they arise, and the _last_ we suffer is remov'd by the _sweet Sleep_ of Death.

IV. _The fulfilling or Satisfaction of this_ Desire, _produces the Sensation of_ Pleasure, _great or small in exact proportion to the_ Desire.

_Pleasure_ is that Satisfaction which arises in the Mind upon, and is caus'd by, the accomplishment of our _Desires_, and by no other Means at all; and those Desires being above shewn to be caus'd by our _Pains_ or _Uneasinesses_, it follows that _Pleasure_ is wholly caus'd by _Pain_, and by no other Thing at all.

V. _Therefore the Sensation of_ Pleasure _is equal, or in exact proportion to the Sensation of_ Pain.

As the _Desire_ of being freed from Uneasiness is equal to the _Uneasiness_, and the _Pleasure_ of satisfying that Desire equal to the _Desire_, the _Pleasure_ thereby produc'd must necessarily be equal to the _Uneasiness_ or _Pain_ which produces it: of three Lines, _A_, _B_, and _C_, if _A_ is equal to _B_, and _B_ to _C_, _C_ must be equal to _A_. And as our _Uneasinesses_ are always remov'd by some Means or other, it follows that _Pleasure_ and _Pain_ are in their Nature inseparable: So many Degrees as one Scale of the Ballance descends, so many exactly the other ascends; and one cannot rise or fall without the

You have a View of the whole Argument in a few familiar Examples: The _Pain_ of Abstinence from Food, as it is greater or less, produces a greater or less _Desire_ of Eating, the Accomplishment of this _Desire_ produces a greater or less _Pleasure_ proportionate to it. The _Pain_ of Confinement causes the _Desire_ of Liberty, which accomplish'd, yields a _Pleasure_ equal to that _Pain_ of Confinement. The _Pain_ of Labour and Fatigue causes the _Pleasure_ of Rest, equal to that _Pain_. The _Pain_ of Absence from Friends, produces the _Pleasure_ of Meeting in exact proportion. _&c._

This is the _fixt Nature_ of Pleasure and Pain, and will always be found to be so by those who examine it.

One of the most common Arguments for the future Existence of the Soul, is taken from the generally suppos'd Inequality of Pain and Pleasure in the present; and this, notwithstanding the Difficulty by outward Appearances to make a Judgment of another's Happiness, has been look'd upon as almost unanswerable: but since _Pain_ naturally and infallibly produces a _Pleasure_ in proportion to it, every individual Creature must, in any State of _Life_, have an equal Quant.i.ty of each, so that there is not, on that Account, any Occasion for a future Adjustment.

Thus are all the Works of the Creator _equally_ us'd by him; And no Condition of Life or Being is in itself better or preferable to another: The Monarch is not more happy than the Slave, nor the Beggar more miserable than _Crsus_. Suppose _A_, _B_, and _C_, three distinct Beings; _A_ and _B_, animate, capable of _Pleasure_ and _Pain_, _C_ an inanimate Piece of Matter, insensible of either. _A_ receives ten Degrees of _Pain_, which are necessarily succeeded by ten Degrees of _Pleasure_: _B_ receives fifteen of _Pain_, and the consequent equal Number of _Pleasure_: _C_ all the while lies unconcern'd, and as he has not suffer'd the former, has no right to the latter. What can be more equal and just than this? When the Accounts come to be adjusted, _A_ has no Reason to complain that his Portion of _Pleasure_ was five Degrees less than that of _B_, for his Portion of _Pain_ was five Degrees less likewise: Nor has _B_ any Reason to boast that his _Pleasure_ was five Degrees greater than that of _A_, for his _Pain_ was proportionate: They are then both on the same Foot with _C_, that is, they are neither Gainers nor Losers.

It will possibly be objected here, that even common Experience shews us, there is not in Fact this Equality: "Some we see hearty, brisk and chearful perpetually, while others are constantly burden'd with a heavy Load of Maladies and Misfortunes, remaining for Years perhaps in Poverty, Disgrace, or Pain, and die at last without any Appearance of Recompence." Now tho' 'tis not necessary, when a Proposition is demonstrated to be a general Truth, to shew in what manner it agrees with the particular Circ.u.mstances of Persons, and indeed ought not to be requir'd; yet, as this is a common Objection, some Notice may be taken of it: And here let it be observ'd, that we cannot be proper Judges of the good or bad Fortune of Others; we are apt to imagine, that what would give us a great Uneasiness or a great Satisfaction, has the same Effect upon others: we think, for Instance, those unhappy, who must depend upon Charity for a mean Subsistence, who go in Rags, fare hardly, and are despis'd and scorn'd by all; not considering that Custom renders all these Things easy, familiar, and even pleasant. When we see Riches, Grandeur and a chearful Countenance, we easily imagine Happiness accompanies them, when oftentimes 'tis quite otherwise: Nor is a constantly sorrowful Look, attended with continual Complaints, an infallible Indication of Unhappiness. In short, we can judge by nothing but Appearances, and they are very apt to deceive us. Some put on a gay chearful Outside, and appear to the World perfectly at Ease, tho' even then, some inward Sting, some secret Pain imbitters all their Joys, and makes the Ballance even: Others appear continually dejected and full of Sorrow; but even Grief itself is sometimes _pleasant_, and Tears are not always without their Sweetness: Besides, Some take a Satisfaction in being thought unhappy, (as others take a Pride in being thought humble,) these will paint their Misfortunes to others in the strongest Colours, and leave no Means unus'd to make you think them throughly miserable; so great a Pleasure it is to them _to be pitied_. Others retain the Form and outside Shew of Sorrow, long after the Thing itself, with its Cause, is remov'd from the Mind; it is a Habit they have acquir'd and cannot leave. These, with many others that might be given, are Reasons why we cannot make a true Estimate of the _Equality_ of the Happiness and Unhappiness of others; and unless we could, Matter of Fact cannot be opposed to this Hypothesis. Indeed, we are sometimes apt to think, that the Uneasinesses we ourselves have had, outweigh our Pleasures; but the Reason is this, the Mind takes no Account of the latter, they flip away un-remark'd, when the former leave more lasting Impressions on the Memory. But suppose we pa.s.s the greatest part of Life in Pain and Sorrow, suppose we die by Torments and _think no more_, 'tis no Diminution to the Truth of what is here advanc'd; for the _Pain_, tho'

exquisite, is not so to the _last_ Moments of Life, the Senses are soon benumm'd, and render'd incapable of transmitting it so sharply to the Soul as at first; She perceives it cannot hold long, and 'tis an _exquisite Pleasure_ to behold the immediate Approaches of Rest. This makes an Equivalent tho' Annihilation should follow: For the Quant.i.ty of _Pleasure_ and _Pain_ is not to be measur'd by its Duration, any more than the Quant.i.ty of Matter by its Extension; and as one cubic Inch may be made to contain, by Condensation, as much Matter as would fill ten thousand cubic Feet, being more expanded, so one single Moment of _Pleasure_ may outweigh and compensate an Age of _Pain_.

It was owing to their Ignorance of the Nature of Pleasure and Pain that the Antient Heathens believ'd the idle Fable of their _Elizium_, that State of uninterrupted Ease and Happiness! The Thing is intirely impossible in Nature! Are not the Pleasures of the Spring made such by the Disagreeableness of the Winter? Is not the Pleasure of fair Weather owing to the Unpleasantness of foul? Certainly. Were it then always Spring, were the Fields always green and nouris.h.i.+ng, and the Weather constantly serene and fair, the Pleasure would pall and die upon our Hands; it would cease to be Pleasure to us, when it is not usher'd in by Uneasiness. Could the Philosopher visit, in reality, every Star and Planet with as much Ease and Swiftness as he can now visit their Ideas, and pa.s.s from one to another of them in the Imagination; it would be a _Pleasure_ I grant; but it would be only in proportion to the _Desire_ of accomplis.h.i.+ng it, and that would be no greater than the _Uneasiness_ suffer'd in the Want of it. The Accomplishment of a long and difficult Journey yields a great _Pleasure_; but if we could take a Trip to the Moon and back again, as frequently and with as much Ease as we can go and come from Market, the Satisfaction would be just the same.

The _Immateriality_ of the Soul has been frequently made use of as an Argument for its _Immortality_; but let us consider, that tho' it should be allow'd to be immaterial, and consequently its Parts incapable of Separation or Destruction by any Thing material, yet by Experience we find, that it is not incapable of Cessation of _Thought_, which is its Action. When the Body is but a little indispos'd it has an evident Effect upon the Mind; and a right Disposition of the Organs is requisite to a right Manner of Thinking. In a sound Sleep sometimes, or in a Swoon, we cease to think at all; tho' the Soul is not therefore then annihilated, but _exists_ all the while tho' it does not _act_; and may not this probably be the Case after Death? All our Ideas are first admitted by the Senses and imprinted on the Brain, increasing in Number by Observation and Experience; there they become the Subjects of the Soul's Action. The Soul is a mere Power or Faculty of _contemplating_ on, and _comparing_ those Ideas when it has them; hence springs Reason: But as it can _think_ on nothing but Ideas, it must have them before it can _think_ at all. Therefore as it may exist before it has receiv'd any Ideas, it may exist before it _thinks_. To remember a Thing, is to have the Idea of it still plainly imprinted on the Brain, which the Soul can turn to and contemplate on Occasion. To forget a Thing, is to have the Idea of it defac'd and destroy'd by some Accident, or the crouding in and imprinting of great variety of other Ideas upon it, so that the Soul cannot find out its Traces and distinguish it. When we have thus lost the Idea of any one Thing, we can _think_ no more, or _cease to think_, on that Thing; and as we can lose the Idea of one Thing, so we may of ten, twenty, a hundred, &c. and even of all Things, because they are not in their Nature permanent; and often during Life we see that some Men, (by an Accident or Distemper affecting the Brain,) lose the greatest Part of their Ideas, and remember very little of their past Actions and Circ.u.mstances. Now upon _Death_, and the Destruction of the Body, the Ideas contain'd in the Brain, (which are alone the Subjects of the Soul's Action) being then likewise necessarily destroy'd, the Soul, tho'

incapable of Destruction itself, must then necessarily _cease to think_ or _act_, having nothing left to think or act upon. It is reduc'd to its first unconscious State before it receiv'd any Ideas. And to cease to _think_ is but little different from _ceasing to be_.

Nevertheless, 'tis not impossible that this same _Faculty_ of contemplating Ideas may be hereafter united to a new Body, and receive a new Set of Ideas; but that will no way concern us who are now living; for the Ident.i.ty will be lost, it is no longer that same _Self_ but a new Being.

I shall here subjoin a short Recapitulation of the Whole, that it may with all its Parts be comprehended at one View.

1. _It is suppos'd that G.o.d the Maker and Governour of the Universe, is infinitely wise, good, and powerful._

2. _In consequence of His Infinite Wisdom and Goodness, it is a.s.serted, that whatever He doth must be infinitely wise and good;_

3. _Unless He be interrupted, and His Measures broken by some other Being, which is impossible because He is Almighty._

4. _In consequence of His infinite Power, it is a.s.serted, that nothing can exist or be done in the Universe which is not agreeable to His Will, and therefore good._

5. _Evil is hereby excluded, with all Merit and Demerit; and likewise all preference in the Esteem of G.o.d, of one Part of the Creation to another._ This is the Summary of the first Part.

Now our common Notions of Justice will tell us, that if all created Things are equally esteem'd by the Creator, they ought to be equally us'd by Him; and that they are therefore equally us'd, we might embrace for Truth upon the Credit, and as the true Consequence of the foregoing Argument. Nevertheless we proceed to confirm it, by shewing _how_ they are equally us'd, and that in the following Manner.

1. _A Creature when endu'd with Life or Consciousness, is made capable of Uneasiness or Pain._

2. _This Pain produces Desire to be freed from it, in exact proportion to itself._

3. _The Accomplishment of this Desire produces an equal Pleasure._

4. _Pleasure is consequently equal to Pain._

From these Propositions it is observ'd,

1. _That every Creature hath as much Pleasure as Pain._

2. _That Life is not preferable to Insensibility; for Pleasure and Pain destroy one another: That Being which has ten Degrees of Pain subtracted from ten of Pleasure, has nothing remaining, and is upon an equality with that Being which is insensible of both._

3. _As the first Part proves that all Things must be equally us'd by the Creator because equally esteem'd; so this second Part demonstrates that they are equally esteem'd because equally us'd._

4. _Since every Action is the Effect of Self-Uneasiness, the Distinction of Virtue and Vice is excluded; and_ Prop. VIII. _in_ Sect. I. _again demonstrated._

5. _No State of Life can be happier than the present, because Pleasure and Pain are inseparable._

Thus both Parts of this Argument agree with and confirm one another, and the Demonstration is reciprocal.

I am sensible that the Doctrine here advanc'd, if it were to be publish'd, would meet with but an indifferent Reception. Mankind naturally and generally love to be flatter'd: Whatever sooths our Pride, and tends to exalt our Species above the rest of the Creation, we are pleas'd with and easily believe, when ungrateful Truths shall be with the utmost Indignation rejected. "What! bring ourselves down to an Equality with the Beasts of the Field! with the _meanest_ part of the Creation! 'Tis insufferable!" But, (to use a Piece of _common_ Sense) our _Geese_ are but _Geese_ tho' we may think 'em _Swans_, and Truth will be Truth tho' it sometimes prove mortifying and distasteful.

RULES FOR A CLUB ESTABLISHED FOR MUTUAL IMPROVEMENT[20]

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